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RECENT TAX LEGISLATION-
THE EXCISE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1970
John R. Price*
The Excise, Estate and Gift Tax Adjustment Act of 19701 will re-
sult in a temporary increase in the revenue derived from estate and
gift taxes, a potentially longer-term increase in excise tax revenues2
and a permanent decrease in the revenue generated by the minimum
tax on items of tax preference income and by the aircraft use tax.3
More important, it will have an enduring effect on estate, gift and
income tax planning and procedures. The origins and principal provi-
sions of the Act will be discussed in the first few pages of this article,
after which the provisions relating to the estate tax will be considered
in detail. They will receive special attention because they are more
numerous, more complex, and more important than those of any
other segment of the Act.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1958, University of
Florida; LL.B., 1961, New York University.
1. 84 Stat. 1836 (codified in scattered sections of INT. REV. CODE of 1954 [herein-
after cited IRC] ).
2. The excise tax on new automobiles and communications services was extended
by the Act for a number of years. See text accompanying notes 31-33, infra. However,
on August 15, 1971 President Nixon proposed the repeal of the excise tax on automo-
biles as a part of "the most comprehensive new economic policy to be undertaken in this
Nation in four decades." The President's Radio and Television Address to the Nation
Outlining a New Economic Policy for the United States, Aug. 15, 1971, in 7 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1168, 1171 (1971). On December 10, 1971 President Nixon
signed the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178 (Dec. 10, 1971), 7 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1642 (1971), which liberalized the federal tax laws in many
respects and repealed the excise tax on passenger automobiles and trucks weighing
10,000 pounds or less effective December 11, 1971. In addition the 1971 Act pro-
vided for the refund of excise taxes on automobiles sold after August 15, 1971 and
lightweight trucks sold after September 22, 1971. Thus a revenue increase may be
derived from the extension of the excise tax on communications services but the an-
ticipated increase in revenue from the extension of the automobile excise tax will not
be realized because of its subsequent repeal.
3. The excise, estate and gift tax provisions of the Act were originally contained in
H. R. 19868, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which passed the House on Friday, December
11, 1970. 116 CONG. REc. HI 1566 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1970). When the House action was
reported to the Senate the following Monday, the bill was ordered held at the desk and
was not referred to the Senate Finance Committee as would be customary. 116 CONG.
REC. S20055, D 1270 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1970). Nevertheless, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee considered it in executive session and reported it out with relatively few
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I. ORIGINS OF THE ACT
In mid-1970 the administration recommended three revenue-
raising measures to Congress for the purpose of limiting the budget
deficit which was projected for fiscal 197 1.4 The first, which was an-
nounced by the President on April 3, 1970, called for the accelerated
collection of estate and gift taxes. 5 The other two, announced in July
of 1970, proposed a one year extension of the excise taxes on automo-
biles and communications services6 and the imposition of a special tax
on lead additives to gasoline. 7 The doubling-up in estate and gift tax
collections which would result from the first proposal was expected to
yield a one-time revenue increase of $1.5 billion, all of which would
be realized in fiscal 1971.8 The extension of the excise taxes would
changes on December 15, 1970 as an amendment to H.R. 16199, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1970), a minor bill before the Committee which had originally provided only for
the establishment of a working capital fund for the Department of the Treasury. S. REP.
No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 S. REP.]. The
establishment of the working capital fund will not be mentioned again because of its
minor importance and lack of connection with the principal contents of the Act.
The record does not indicate the reason H.R. 19868 was not referred to the Finance
Committee when it reached the Senate. Possibly it was not referred to the Committee in
order to expedite Senate consideration of the bill. The remarks of the Senate Finance
Committee Chairman, Senator Long, indicate some dissatisfaction with the procedure
which was followed:
In the Finance Committee we were forced to add the excise and estate and gift tax
bill to a small bill pending in our committee because this bill was not referred to
our committee. We thought that as the Finance Committee of the U.S. Senate, we
should consider important legislation of this type before action is taken by the
Senate. We took that action in the only way we could-by adding the excise and
estate and gift tax bill to a minor bill before our committee.
116 CONG. REC. S21365 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1970).
4. When former Secretary of the Treasury David M. Kennedy testified before the
House Ways and Means Committee on September 9, 1970, he stated that the budget
deficit for 1971 would be greater than the $1.3 billion which had been projected in May
and added that "we desperately need the revenues that we have recommended." Hear-
i on the Tax Recommendations of the President Before tile House Conmn. on Ways
and Means, 9 Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Tax Hearings].
5. The President's Message to the Congress in Connection With Settlement of the
Postal Dispute, Apr. 3, 1970, in 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 471 (1970).
6. The extension of the excise taxes was proposed on July 30, 1970. Letter from then
Secretary of the Treasury David M. Kennedy to Hon. John W. McCormack, July 30,
1970, in 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 9.
7. The special tax on lead additives was proposed by the President on May 19,
1970. Statement by the President Upon Issuing Revised Estimates for Fiscal Years 1970
and 1971, May 19, 1970, in 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 659 (1970).
8. President's Message to the Congress in Connection With Settlement of the Postal
Dispute, Apr. 3, 1970, in 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 473 (1970): Letter from Sec-
retary Kennedy to Speaker McCormack, 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 11.
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"prevent a revenue loss of $650 million in the fiscal year 1971 and
$1,250 million the fiscal year 1972."9 The lead tax was expected to
"result in a first year revenue gain of approximately $1.6 billion." 10
Modified forms of the estate and gift tax acceleration proposals and
the excise tax extension were enacted, but the lead tax proposal did
not survive the House Ways and Means Committee's hearings. 1
At the time the proposals were made public the administration ex-
pected budget deficits of $1-2 billion for each of fiscal 1970 and
1971.12 President Nixon explained that the deficits were anticipated
because of a "shortfall" in tax collections, "increases in uncontrollable
outlays, such as interest on the public debt, farm price supports and
public assistance grants, as well as a Federal employees pay raise" and
Congressional largesse.13 The administration proposed measures
which would produce only temporary increases in tax yields because
of an expectation that the economy would "shortly resume a more
rapid yet steady and more sustainable rate of increase that will not
fuel a new inflation."' 4 Economic activity did not revive in the
ensuing months, which led the President to propose a seriously unbal-
anced budget for fiscal 1972,15 to order the liberalization of income
9. Letter from Secretary Kennedy to Speaker McCormack, in 1970 Tax Hearings,
supra note 4, at 9. The subsequent repeal of the excise tax on automobiles and light-
weight trucks, see note 2, supra, negates the effect of the extension of that tax. The
House Ways and Means Committee stated that the repeal will result in a revenue loss
of $2.5 billion in fiscal 1972, $2.4 billion in fiscal 1973 and diminishing amounts there-
after. H. R. REP. No. 92-53, 92nd Cong:, 1st Sess. 58 (1971).
10. 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 13.
11. On February 8, 1971 the President announced that he would "again propose a
special tax to make the price of unleaded gasoline lower than the price of leaded gaso-
line." The President's 1971 Environmental Program, Feb. 8, 1971 in 7 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Docs. 187, 190 (1971).
12. Statement of the President Upon Issuing Revised Estimates for Fiscal Years
1970 and 1971, supra note 7, at 659; Testimony of Secretary Kennedy before the House
Ways and Means Committee, 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 65-67.
13. Statement of the President Upon Issuing Revised Estimates for Fiscal Years
1970 and 1971, supra note 7, at 659.
14. Id.
15. The budget President Nixon submitted to Congress for fiscal 1972 contemplated
an actual deficit of $11.6 billion. When it was submitted it was heralded as coming
within $100 million of the "full employment budget"-"the revenue the economy could
generate under the existing tax system at a time of full employment." The President's
Message to the Congress Transmitting the Budget for Fiscal Year 1972, Jan. 29, 1971,
in 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 130, 131 (1971). It reflected an abandonment of the
strict "pay-as-you-go" policy which the administration had espoused earlier. See Presi-
dent's Message to Congress in Connection With Settlement of the Postal Dispute, supra
note 5, at 471.
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tax depreciation regulations1 6 and, finally, to adopt a sweeping new
economic policy on August 15, 1971.1 7
The history of the Act spans the nine month period between April
3, 1970, when the President proposed that the collection of estate and
gift taxes be accelerated in order to offset the cost of wage increases
granted government employees, t 8 and December 31, 1970, when the
16. See Statement by the President Upon Announcing Changes in the Depreciation
Provisions, Jan. 1I, 197 1, in 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 58 (1971). The new rules
were adopted as Treas. Reg. § 1.176(a)-Il on June 22, 1971. In August, 1971, the
Treasury issued a 37 page statement explaining the regulations, the major reasons for
their adoption, their intended economic effects and a general defense of their propriety
and legality. 1971 INT. REV. BULL. No. 34, at 29. Paradoxically, the new depreciation
rules will reduce the annual federal income tax payments of business by more than the
entire annual yield of the estate tax. See Statement by the President Upon Announcing
Changes in the Depreciation Provisions, supra at 58. The changes are intended to
permit "business firms to reduce tax payments now, when additional purchasing power
is needed." Id. at 59. The changes would appear to run counter to the administration's
previous anti-inflationary efforts.
17. The new economic policy of the administration was announced by the President
with apparent enthusiasm although it included elements which he had long spurned. Its
principal features were (1) a tax credit of 10 percent for investment in new equipment,
reducing to 5 percent in 1972; (2) the repeal of the 7 percent excise tax on automobiles:
(3) an advance of the scheduled $50 increase in the personal income tax exemption from
January 1, 1973 to January 1, 1972; (4) a 90 day price and wage freeze; (5) a general
suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold; and (6) an additional duty of 10
percent on a broad range of imports. The President's Radio and Television Address to
the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy for the United States. supra note 2. The
price and wage freeze was ordered in Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15727
(1971), and the additional duty was imposed by Proclamation No. 4074. 36 Fed. Reg.
15724 (1971). It is interesting to note that less than two months before the President's
announcement Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally, Jr. had stated that the Presi-
dent
has considered, at great depth, all of the advice he has had from all of the many
sources. He has come to the conclusion that, number one, he's not going to institute
a wage-price review board; number two, he's not going to impose mandatory wage
and price controls; number three, he's not going to ask the Congress for any tax re-
lief; and number four, that he's not going to increase fiscal spending.
Remarks of Secretary Connally. June 29. 1971, in 7 WEEKI Y COMP. OF PRES. Docs.
1002, 1003 (1971). For good or ill, the new policy included practically all of the ingredi-
ents the President was reported to have spurned.
18. The President's statements indicate that he might consider the history of the Act
as beginning with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In making the revenue-raising proposals
in 1970, the President repeatedly chided Congress for having included excessive tax
reductions in the Tax Reform Act. With respect to 1971 fiscal problems, the President
stated: "It should be noted that the deficit now projected for fiscal 1971 would have been
more than covered by the amount of revenue which the Congress chose to eliminate
from my recommendations for the Tax Reform Act of 1969." Statement by the Presi-
dent Upon Issuing Revised Estimates for Fiscal Years 1970 and 1971, supra note 7, at
659. As it happened, the deficits projected in May of 1970, $1.8 billion for fiscal 1970
and $1.3 billion for 1972, proved to be far too optimistic. The actual deficit for 1970
was $2.8 billion and in January of 1971 the deficit for 1971 was estimated at S 18.6 bil-
lion. The President's Message to the Congress Transmitting the Budget for Fiscal Year
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Act was finally passed by Congress.' 9 The principal events which took
place in the interim are discussed below.
II. PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
A. Estate and Gift Tax Acceleration
The administration's proposals for the accelerated collection of es-
tate and gift taxes were spoken of as a unit, but they were in fact inde-
pendent and met somewhat different fates. The relatively simple gift
tax proposal was enacted by Congress without substantial change,
whereas the more complex and controversial estate tax proposal was
abandoned in favor of an alternative plan sponsored by the Trust Di-
vision of the American Bankers Association and the Tax Section of
the American Bar Association.
The administration's gift tax proposal required "the filing of the gift
tax return and the payment of the gift tax ... on a quarterly basis,
that is, on the last day of the month following the end of the calendar
quarter in which the gift was made. '20 It was intended to limit the
extent to which the payment of gift taxes could be deferred and to
place the gift tax on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Formerly a gift tax
payment might not be due until as much as fifteen and one-half
months after the gift was made. Quarterly returns were not expected
to be burdensome because "a substantial majority of taxpayers
1972, supra note 15, at 131. See also Wall St. Journal, Feb. 1, 1971, at 4, col. I (Pacific
Coafst ed.). Secretary of the Treasury Connally observed in June of 1971 "that the deficit
is going to run substantially in excess of the $18 billion that has been anticipated."
Remarks of Secretary Connally, supra note 17, at 1003.
19. See note 3, supra. On the floor of the Senate the bill was amended to include two
tax reduction provisions and was passed on December 29, 1970. 116 CONG. REC.
S21369 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1970). The House concurred in the amendments with one
change on December 31, 1970. 116 CONG. REc. H12578 (daily ed. Dec. 31, 1970). The
Senate acquiesced later the same day. 116 CONG. REC. S21708 (daily ed. Dec. 31, 1970).
The bill was also signed by the President on December 31, 1970. 116 CONG. REc. E11130
(daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971); 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 51 (1971).
20. Letter from Secretary Kennedy to Speaker McCormack, in 1970 Tax Hearings,
supra note 4, at 9 (describing the administration's proposal and forwarding drafts of the
proposed legislation). The estate and gift tax proposals were first described in detail in a
letter Secretary Kennedy sent to congressional leaders on April 15, 1970. 2 CCH FED.
EST. & GIFT TAX REP. 8260 (1970). The contents of this letter are described in 129 J.
ACCOUNTANCY 73 (1970); Treasury Tells How Estimated Estate and Gift Taxes Would
Work, 33 J. TAXATION 53 (1970); and 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 1 (press re-
lease containing Chairman Mills' announcement that hearings would be held on the
President's recommendations).
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making taxable gifts make all such gifts in a single calendar quarter of
any taxable year."21
The estate tax proposal required the filing of an estimated tax re-
turn within seven months of death if the decedent's gross estate ex-
ceeded $150,000 in value on the date of death. In those cases an esti-
mated estate tax payment of the lesser of "80 percent of the estate tax
which would be due if the gross estate were valued as of the date of
death" or "the value of the 'net liquid assets' six months after death"
would be due when the return was filed. 22
Both proposals were swiftly condemned by interested groups, par-
ticularly the Tax Section of the American Bar Association and the
Trust Division of the American Bankers Association. 23 The Tax Sec-
tion's Committee on Estate and Gift Taxation prepared a statement
21. Letter from Secretary Kennedy to Speaker McCormack, in 1970 Tax Hearings,
mupra note 4, at 10.
22. Id. As a result of limiting the estate tax plan to gross estates exceeding
$150,000, the proposal was expected to affect only 35,000 of the 100.000 estates for
which returns are filed annually. Id.
"Net liquid assets" was defined to
include cash, readily marketable securities, and other liquid assets in the gross estate
less funeral and administrative expenses, debts payable within fifteen months after
death, and an allowance of $15,000 for a surviving spouse or minor child plus
$5,000 for each additional surviving minor child.
Id. This limitation was intended to "prevent hardship for those estates which consist of
non-liquid assets. ... Id.
23. Speech by William K. Stevens, Vice President of the First National Bank of
Chicago, at the Southern Trust Conference in Biloxi, Mississippi, June, 1970, reported
in Estimated Estate and Gift Taxes: New Rides Create New Problems, 33 J. TAXATION
52 (1970): Statement of Section of Taxation in Opposition to Legislative Proposals for
Accelerated Paymnent of Estate and Gift Taxes, 23 TAX LAWYER 683 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Tax Section Statement].
Surprisingly, the administration appears not to have discussed the proposals with rep-
resentatives of any interested groups outside the government prior to making them
public. The reason for that tactic is uncertain. The possibility of engaging in advance
discussions may have been overlooked or it may have been considered and rejected
on the ground that conduct of such discussions would jeopardize, or at least
delay, the enactment of any acceleration proposal. Had advance discussions taken
place, the administration might have been spared the embarrassment of sponsoring a
measure as deficient as the original estate tax acceleration proposal. On the other hand.
the original estate tax proposal might have been advanced principally as a strategem.
intended to induce agreement to a less radical measure. That possibility is suggested by
testimony given at the hearings to the effect that the bar feared the original proposal and
that the alternate proposal was conceived and sponsored out of that fear. 1970 Tax
Hearings, supra note 4, at 275-76 (testimony of Harrold J. McComas). But see id. at 89
(testimony of John S. Nolan).
It is also surprising that the Treasury appeared not to have considered accelerating
estate tax collections by simply advancing the payment date in the manner of the alter-
native. See Letter from Secretary Kennedy to Speaker McCormack, in 1970 Tax Hear-
ings, supra note 4. at 10-1I: 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4. at 43 (testimony of Secre-
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setting forth "(1) policy objections to and technical deficiencies in
the Administration's proposal, and (2) an alternative proposal de-
signed to achieve the revenue increase sought by the Administration
... without the technical defects and complexities in, and certain
of the policy objections to, the Administration's proposal. 24 The
statement registered relatively mild opposition to the gift tax accel-
eration proposal and offered no alternative to it. The principal ob-
jections to the gift tax plan were that it was a thinly-disguised tax
increase, that it would not result in a revenue increase because do-
nors would defer making gifts until the last quarter of the calendar
year and that it should not be considered apart from overall estate and
gift tax reform.25
tary Kennedy). The dates for payment or deposit of other taxes have been advanced
enough times in recent years for the Treasury to have more than a passing familiarity
with the technique. Perhaps the most well known accelerations have taken place with
respect to the payment of corporate income taxes. Prior to 1954, the tax was paid after
the close of the tax year to which the liability related. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, §§ 52-56.
Beginning in 1954, corporations were required to pay part of their income tax on a cur-
rent basis-during a tax year they had to file declarations and make installment pay-
ments of part of their estimated income tax liability for the year. IRC § 6154. Amend-
ments made in 1964 and 1966 changed the scheme to put corporations on a fully current
basis to the extent their estimated tax liability exceeded $100,000. Finally, provision
was made to phase out the $100,000 exemption from estimated tax payments. Tax Ex-
penditure Control Act of 1968, § 103(b), IRC § 6154(c). The dates for payment of the
estate and gift taxes had not previously been advanced. On the contrary, the payment
date for each of them had been moved back once. From the enactment of the original
estate tax in 1916, Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, tit. II, 39 Stat. 777, until 1935 the es-
tate tax return was due and the tax was payable within twelve months following death.
The period was lengthened to fifteen months when the alternate valuation provisions
were adopted in 1935. From 1932 through 1954, gift tax returns were due and the tax
was payable "on or before the 15th day of March following the close of the calendar
year." Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, tit. III, § 509, 47 Stat. 245. The 1954 Code moved
the date back one month. IRC § 6075(b). The tax was payable at the same time. Id.
§ 6151(a).
24. Report of the Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, 23 TAX LAWYER 711 (1970).
The Council of the Tax Section approved the statement later in May and distributed it
to each member of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance
Committee and to Treasury and Congressional tax officials. Id.
25. It is fortunate that the consideration of the proposals was not deferred until the
administration delivered its long-promised estate and gift tax reform package. Secretary
of the Treasury John B. Connally, Jr. has made it clear that he disapproves of most of
the estate and gift tax reform proposals which have been advanced and that the Treasury
does not intend to submit any estate and gift tax reform plan to Congress in 1971. Wall
St. Journal, March 10, 1971, at 4, col. 2 (Eastern ed.); N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1971, at 34,
col. 1. Secretary Connally's intention contrasts with the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee's announced intention to study the estate and gift tax laws "as soon as possible."
H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1969). It also contrasts with the
administration's prior plans. For example, on September 9, 1970, then Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury John S. Nolan told the Ways and Means Committee: "Asfaeas
we know, the committee will want to take this subject up next year and we will present
recommendations at that time." 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 88.
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The estate tax proposal was also opposed as a tax increase and as a
matter which should await the overall reform proposals. In addition,
the statement criticized this proposal because it "would permanently
impair prudent and orderly estate administration, create unforeseen
hardships, add to the already heavy burden of taxes on estates, be
expensive to administer and to comply with, and foment uncertainties
and litigation." 26 More specific criticisms were that (1) executors
would be required to determine the content and value of decendents'
estates within an unreasonably short time, (2) the estimated tax return
would be due before decisions regarding the alternate valuation and
other matters affecting the estate tax could be made, and (3) the
amount of estimated tax due would not be diminished although the
"liquid assets" included in the gross estate were not in the executor's
possession or subject to his control (e.g., life insurance passing to
named beneficiaries or securities gratuitously transferred in contempla-
tion of death) or were exonerated from the burden of the tax by tax
apportionment provisions of the decedent's will or by applicable state
law. 27 It also would reduce an executor's freedom in arranging for the
orderly liquidation of assets to meet the estate's cash requirements: 28
In a falling market the executor, faced with the problem of having to
raise an estimated tax based on date of death values out of a shrinking
estate, may be forced into wholesale and precipitate liquidation at the
very worst time. In a rising market the executor, caught between the
Scylla of the six-month holding period for long-term capital gain and
the Charybdis of the seven-month payment date, would, in this era of
brokerage house paperwork jams, have substantially less than a month
in which to liquidate a substantial proportion of the estate's assets.
The preparation and processing of an additional estate tax return for
all estates subject to the estimated tax would impose a substan-
tial burden on taxpayers and the government. Also, penalties would be
imposed if the estimated tax was underpaid, which might occur if the
assets of the estate were undervalued on the date of death. Thus, an
executor electing to use the alternate valuation date in the final estate
tax return might be called upon to substantiate his valuation of assets
on two dates-the date of death and the alternate valuation date.
26. Tax Section Statement, ,supra note 23, at 683.
27. Id. at 684-86.
28. Id. at 685.
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Appreciating that the administration viewed the accelerated collec-
tion of the estate tax as a fiscal imperative, the Tax Section proposed
an alternative plan, the substance of which was accepted by the ad-
ministration 29 and, ultimately, enacted. It called for an advance of the
due date for the estate tax return and the tax payment date to nine
months after death, an acceleration of the alternate valuation date
from one year to six months after death, and a reduction of the gen-
eral three year estate tax limitations period of section 6501 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code to one year after the due date of the return. In
order to facilitate those changes, the Tax Section also proposed a lib-
eralization of the rules under which extensions of time to pay the tax
might be granted and a change of the holding period rules to provide
that gains or losses realized on the sale or exchange of property in-
cluded in the gross estate within six months of death be treated as long
term.3 0
The administration was wise in accepting the alternative plan in
lieu of its original proposal. Although each would generate approx-
imately the same amount of additional revenue, the alternative was
superior in practically every respect. It was much simpler and stayed
well within the framework of the existing law. Unlike the original
proposal, the alternative plan did not involve the adoption of new
and uncertain concepts and would not require additional tax returns
of any estate. Also, by advancing all of the steps in the estate tax de-
termination process, the alternative plan would facilitate the earlier
settlement of estates and the earlier distribution of property to benefi-
ciaries. In contrast, the original proposal would only have advanced
the time at which large estates were required to pay a substantial part
of the tax. Finally, the alternative was accompanied by proposals
which called for some generally desirable liberalizations of related
laws. Those which were carried forward into the Act expand the cir-
cumstances under which executors and other fiduciaries may obtain
discharges from personal liability for a decedent's federal taxes,
amend the holding period rules to provide that property acquired
29. On September 9, 1970, then Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy told the House
Ways and Means Committee that " [a] fter study we have concluded that this alternative
is preferable to our original proposal for an estimated estate tax, and accordingly we
now recommend the principal features of the proposal to you. ... 1970 Tax Hear-
ings, supra note 4, at 43.
30. Tax Section Statement, supra note 23, at 687-88.
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from a decedent is deemed to have been held for more than six
months and relax the rules under which extensions of time for paying
the tax may be granted.
B. Excise Tax Extension
In July of 1970 the administration proposed that the scheduled
reductions in the excise tax rates applicable to automobiles and com-
munications services be postponed for one year.31 As noted above, the
postponement was sought because it would preserve $650 million of
revenue in fiscal 1971 and $1,250 million in fiscal 1972, all of which
the administration had taken into account when the 1971 budget was
prepared. Under this proposal, the rates would have remained at
seven percent for automobiles and ten percent for communications
services in 1971, decreasing to five percent each in 1972, three per-
cent each in 1973, one percent each in 1974 and expiring January 1,
1975.32 The Act contains a different reduction schedule which the
Ways and Means Committee devised in order to assure that these
unpopular taxes are eventually eliminated and that Congress would
not again be asked to extend them. 33 In order to provide further budg-
3 1. Letter from Secretary Kennedy to Speaker McCormack, in 1970 Tax Hearings.
supra note 4, at 9.
32. Draft Bill § 2, in 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 15. Considering the
importance the administration attached to the extension of the automobile excise tax in
late 1970, it was hardly imaginable that the President would recant and seek the repeal
of the tax a few months later. However, the President proposed that the excise tax be
repealed as a part of the new economic policy he announced on August 15, 1971.
The tax was repealed in December 1971, See notes 2 and 17, supra.
33. 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 17; H.R. REP. No. 91-1636, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
16-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 H.R. REP.].
During the House debate on the bill (then H.R. 19868) Representative John W.
Byrnes, the ranking minority member of the Ways and Means Committee, affirmed the
Committee's resolve to eliminate the excise taxes:
Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Well, the purpose of the more gradual phaseout in-
cluded in this bill is to avoid the large fiscal impact that is contemplated under the
existing law. Therefore the need for revenue will be a much less [sic] argument for
continuing these taxes at their present rates in the future. It is to make these reduc-
tions more moderate and therefore more acceptable on a year-by-year basis that
the new schedule is included.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I thank the gentleman. Would he not agree with me it
was the intent of the committee as you read it that this tax should ultimately be
repealed in accordance with this? Is that correct?
Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. If that was not our intention, I do not think we
would have established this schedule for reducing and terminating the taxes.
116 CONG. REC. HI 1561 (daily ed. Dec. I1, 1970).
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etary relief, the Act extends the existing rates through 1972 and grad-
ually reduces them over a ten year period so the taxes will be elimi-
nated at the end of 1981. The extension of the automobile excise tax
will not provide any budgetary relief because of its repeal in December
1971.34
The Act also made four technical changes in the excise tax laws.
The first set of changes prescribes a special rule for determining the
constructive sale price of motor vehicles sold by a manufacturer to an
affiliated distributor which then sells them to independent retailers.35
The change is intended to eliminate the tax incentive which the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 had inadvertently given auto manufacturers to
establish and channel sales through affiliated distributors. Under the
new rule the constructive sale price in such cases will be 98.5 percent
of the lowest price at which the affiliated distributor sells the vehicles
in arm's-length transactions to independent retailers rather than the
generally applicable 90 percent. 36 The second set is intended to clarify
the determination of the tax in the case of "further manufacture"--
where a new taxable article is created from tax-paid components. The
clarifications "are intended in effect to result in no item being in-
34. The excise tax on automobiles and lightweight trucks was repealed by the
Revenue Act of 1971. See note 2, supra. The repeal will result in a revenue loss of
$2.5 billion in fiscal 1972. See note 9, supra.
35. IRC § 4216(b)(5).
36. Id. In order to minimize the impact of excise taxes on competition in industries
where some manufacturers sell through affiliated distributors and others sell through
independent wholesalers, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 provided that manufacturers who
sell to affiliated distributors should pay an excise tax based upon a constructive sale price
equal to 90 percent of the lowest price at which the affiliated distributor regularly sells
the goods to independent retailers. Although manufacturers of motor vehicles usually
sell directly to independent retailers and had not been subject to the type of competitive
disadvantage the rule was intended to reduce, it appeared that they could qualify for the
90 percent treatment under the literal language of section 4216(b)(3), thereby reducing
the amount of excise taxes they paid:
Such a manufacturer could then sell its cars and trucks to its affiliated wholesale
distributor and the distributor could then sell the cars and trucks to an independent
retailer at the same price that the manufacturer would otherwise have charged on a
direct sale to the retailer. Even though the creation of the affiliated distributor in
these cases is apt to have little or no economic effect (except that arising from the
tax reduction), it nevertheless results in a reduction of the base upon which the
manufacturers tax is computed and therefore results in a reduction in the tax.
1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 20. Accordingly, the Act raised the constructive sale
price in such cases to 98.5 percent. The new provision was expected "to be used essen-
tially to simplify recordkeeping and is not expected to result in the auto industry being
able to gain a tax advantage from the creation of affiliated distributors. In effect, then, it
is expected and intended that the tax will be neutral with regard to competition within
the auto industry." 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 20-21; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3,
at 21.
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eluded in the tax base more than once. In addition, they are intended
to exclude from the tax base that part of the final price that is essen-
tially a retailing or distributing markup, as distinguished from a man-
ufacturing markup." 37 Third, the excise tax exemption for camper
coaches was extended to units which are designed to be used primarily
as "camping accommodations. '38 The amendment resolves the ques-
tion of whether a one-piece top designed to be mounted on the body
of a pickup truck is within the "camper coach" exemption which was
added to the Code by the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965. 39 Fin-
ally, the Act requires window stickers affixed to new automobiles dis-
tributed after March 31, 1971, to state that the excise tax was im-
posed and the rate at which it was imposed. 40 The requirement is in-
tended to increase consumer awareness of the tax and thereby to
''make more likely the future adherence to the scheduled reduction in
passenger automobile tax rates." 41 The subsequent repeal of the excise
tax on automobiles and lightweight trucks largely moots this change.
C. Tax Reduction Provisions
In view of the need for revenue which led the administration to
propose the revenue raising measures included in the Act, it is ironic
that the Act ultimately came to include provisions which will reduce
37. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 22-23; 1970S. REP., supra note 3, at 23.
38. IRC § 4063(a)(1).
39. Id.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1232a (1970). The Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1231-33 (1970), requires automobile manufacturers to affix a sticker pro-
viding certain information regarding a new automobile on one of the vehicle's win-
dows.
41. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 27; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 27.
This provision apparently originated with Representative Charles E. Chamberlain. a
member of the Ways and Means Committee from Michigan. During the hearings he
stated his opposition to "hidden taxes", such as the excise tax on passenger automobiles.
and said: "I feel certain that if we had on that sticker how much everyone has to pay to
the Federal Government in taxes when they buy an automobile you would not have as
much trouble getting rid of the tax." 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 86. In what
might be viewed as a dazzling display of governmental neutrality in consumer affairs.
Acting Secretary Nolan responded that the administration would not resist "anything of
that nature if the automobile companies were willing to live with such a requirement."
Id. Extrapolating from that exchange and the provisions of the Act, it appears that the
companies did not object to a "requirement" that the sticker state the tax had been im-
posed at a certain rate, but that they did object to a requirement which would reveal the
amount of the tax. As Mr. Nolan observed, a manufacturer "could show the tax sepa-
rately if he chose to do so. Apparently, he doesn't want to because by arithmetic compu-




the yield of two federal taxes-the aircraft use tax, and the minimum
tax on tax preferences. 42 The first, which originated in an amend-
ment offered by Senator Howard W. Cannon, 43 will reduce the rev-
enue derived from the annual use tax on civil aircraft by exempting
the first 2,500 pounds of weight of piston-powered aircraft from the two
cents per pound additional tax which the Airport and Airway Revenue
Act of 197044 had made applicable to the entire weight of such air-
craft weighing more than 2,500 pounds. 45 The second, which is attribut-
able to Senator Jack R. Miller, will further minimize the minimum tax
on items of tax preference by $100 million per year.46 It amended sec-
tion 56 of the Code to allow a seven year carryforward of a taxpayer's
ordinary income tax liability as a deduction in computing the amount
of his tax preference income which is subject to the minimum tax.4 7
42. The excise tax exemption for camper coaches intended for use primarily as
camping accommodations will doubtless also reduce excise tax revenue by some amount,
although that feature was not mentioned in the committee reports. In 1965 it was esti-
mated that the exemption of camper coaches intended for use primarily as living accom-
modations would reduce revenue, earmarked for the Highway Trust Fund by $6 mil-
lion per year. S. REP. No. 324, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 44 (1965).
43. 116 CONG. REC. S21368 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1970).
44. IRC §§ 4491-94, 6426.
45. The amendment will reduce the revenue derived from the annual use tax on
civil aircraft imposed by the Airport Act by an amount which will increase from $2.9
million in fiscal 1972 to $4 million in 1980. 116 CONG. REC. H 12576 (daily ed. Dec. 31,
1970) (remarks of Congressman Mills). All aircraft used during a year remain subject to
an annual use tax of $25 and all jet powered aircraft remain subject to an additional tax
of 31 cents per pound.
46. 116 CONG. REC. H12577 (daily ed. Dec. 31, 1971) (remarks of Congressman
Mills).
47. Under the provisions of section 56 as enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
the base of the minimum tax was computed by deducting a taxpayer's current basic in-
come tax liability from the amount by which his tax preference income for the year ex-
ceeded $30,000. The provision for that deduction originated from a floor amendment to
H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), which was also authored by Senator Miller.
During the debate on the 1970 Act, Senators Miller and Long observed that the lack of a-
carryforward or carryback of the deduction was a "defect" which should be cured. 116
CONG. REC. S20578-79 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1970). They also stated that the defect was not
remedied at the conference on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 because neither the House
nor the Senate version of H.R. 13270 provided for a carryforward or carryback of the
deduction. It is true that the Rules provide that the managers of a conference must con-
fine themselves to the differences committed to them and may not include subjects not
within the disagreements, however germane. RULES AND MANUAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 402, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 546 (1969). However, it is not at all clear that the conferees would have provided
for a carryforward or carryback of the deduction had they been free to consider the sub-
ject. Indeed, the history of Senator Miller's amendment to the 1970 Act suggests that the
House probably would have resisted an attempt to do so.
The carryforward-carryback provision was first offered by Senator Miller and was
first passed by the Senate as an amendment to an excise tax measure, H.R. 17473, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess (1970). 116 CONG. REC. S20579 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1970). Under it, a
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The irony would have been greater had the Hollings-Thurmond bill
for the benefit of the University of South Carolina and the benefici-
aries under the will of a deceased South Carolinian also become part
of the Act.48 With good taste, however, the bill was offered and
adopted as an amendment to another tax measure.49 The Hollings-
Thurmond bill was intended to facilitate a multi-million dollar
gift from the beneficiaries of the estate of Martha W. Brice to the
University of South Carolina by allowing the estate a charitable de-
duction for "an amount equal to any amounts transferred, prior to the
taxpayer's basic income tax liability could be carried back as a deduction for 3 years
and forward for 5 years in computing the amount of tax preference income which was
subject to the minimum tax. The House rejected the amendment because of the Treasury
Department's objections that it would complicate the calculation of the minimum tax
and would reduce the projected $635 million annual yield of the tax by $100 million per
year. 116 CONG. REC. H 12288 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970). The Senate agreed to the House
action, "reserving the right of the Senator from Iowa to offer his amendment on a sub-
sequent bill." 116 CONG. REc. S21125 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970) (remarks of Senator
Long). Accordingly, on December 29, 1970, Senator Miller offered the provision as an
amendment to H.R. 16199, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 116 CONG. REC. S21367 (daily
ed. Dec. 29, 1970). The Senate passed it again and resolved to insist upon all its amend-
ments to H.R. 16199. 116 CONG. REC. S21368, 21369 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1970).
When H. R. 16199 again came before the House, Congressman Mills described the
Miller amendment to the House and pointed out that failure to act on it would jeop-
ardize the entire bill and, thus, the additional revenue it would raise in fiscal 1972. Be-
cause of that risk the Treasury Department recommended that the Senate provision be
accepted by the House in a modified form which would allow a 7 year carryforward but
no carryback. The modification was proposed by Congressman Mills and passed by the
House. 116 CONG. REC. H12577, 12578 (daily ed. Dec. 31, 1970). Senator Miller ac-
quiesced to the change and it was approved by the Senate. 116 CONG. REC. S21708 (daily
ed. Dec. 31, 1970).
Several Congressmen decried the procedure followed by the Senate. Congressman
Byrnes, ranking minority member of the House Ways and Means Committee, said:
I am not happy about the procedure used by the Senate, and I believe it is most
unfortunate. I believe we should make it clear, that by accepting this amendment-
which I consider satisfactory under current circumstances-we do not condone this
method of procedure nor foreclose review of the minimum income tax. In fact, in
my judgment the Senate amendment should be reviewed along with other items in
that minimum tax area, early next year.
116 CONG. REc. H 12577 (daily ed. Dec. 31, 1970).
According to a statement attributed to a Treasury official the administration
will not seek to reverse the change in section 56 despite the substantial loss in revenue it
will cause. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 13, 1971, at 1, col. 5 (Eastern ed.). The minimum tax
has already been jocularly referred to as "the giant that Jack killed" because of Senator
Miller's success in blunting the thrust of the version contained in the Tax Reform Act of
1969. Andrews, Outfoxing the IRS, Wall St. Journal, Apr. 14, 1971, at I col. I (Pacific
Coast ed.).
48. S.3854,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
49. H.R. 17473, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Originally, H.R. 17473 was concerned
only with extending the period during which certain excise tax refunds might be filed. It
was passed as amended and signed by the President on December 31, 1970. 7 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 51 (1971).
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time prescribed by law (including extensions thereof) for the filing of
an estate tax return for such estate, from the proceeds of such estate to
a charitable use specified by Item III of the will of the said Martha W.
Brice .... ,,50 The sponsors justified the bill on the ground that the
decedent had intended to provide for a larger gift to the University
but her will "was improperly drawn and due to a technicality in the
Federal estate tax regulation the executors of the estate are prohibited
from fully carrying out the wishes of the testatrix,"51 that educational
institutions are "stretching every dollar to meet current demands" and
that it would "insure that a substantial gift will be directed for capital
needs of a university. '5 2 Apparently our representatives were per-
suaded by the argument that the federal tax laws should be bent a bit
to provide financial assistance to a venerable educational institution.
In view of the burgeoning enrollments and straitened circumstances
which face most educational institutions today, they doubtless vis-
ualized that the federal funds which would be made available to the
University of South Carolina would be used to build classrooms,
dormitories or other structures necessary to the educational mission
of the institution. It is an outrage and an affront to Congress that
$2.75 million of the funds given the University will be used to finance
a 14,456 seat expansion of the school's already ample football stadium.53
50. 84 Stat. 1880. Mrs. Brice's will required her beneficiaries to expend not less than
$1 million to erect a building for the benefit of one or more of the University of South
Carolina and two other charitable institutions named in her will. The text of the will is
printed in 116 CONG. REC. S20577 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1970). "The heirs," as Representa-
tive Boggs explained to the House, "now would like to fulfill the intent of the decedent
and give an additional $4 million to the University of South Carolina, but financially in
order to do so need to have this recognized as a charitable deduction in the estate of the
decedent." 116 CONG. REc. H12288 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970).
51. 116 CONG. REC. S20576, 20577 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1970) (remarks of Senators
Hollings and Thurmond).
52. Id. The Treasury Department initially opposed the bill. Letter from John S.
Nolan to Senator Thurmond, Dec. 16, 1970, in 116 CONG. REC. S20577-78 (daily ed.
Dec. 18, 1970). However, its opposition was withdrawn "reportedly after Senator Strom
Thurmond of South Carolina asked the White House to intervene." Shanahan, Min-
inum Tax Law Eased by Congress, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1971, at 20, col. 4. On the floor
of the Senate only retiring Senator Williams spoke against the bill. He opposed it be-
cause (1) other estates did not have the same opportunity (i.e., to make gifts after a dece-
dent's death and receive an estate tax charitable deduction for the gifts); (2) it diverted
$3 million from the federal treasury to a privileged charitable donee and (3) it would
establish a precedent for other special legislation. 116 CONG. REC. S20578 (daily ed. Dec.
18, 1970). The bill was not opposed on the floor of the House.
53. The executors contributed a total of $3.5 million to the University of which
$2.75 million was earmarked to the enlargement of the football stadium. Columbia,
S.C., State, Jan. 3, 1971, at I.
This gift will finance the major portion of the first of four phases of a $20 million
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III. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE ESTATE TAX
The provisions of the Act relating to the estate tax can be divided
into three general categories: (1) those dealing principally with the
mechanics of filing returns and paying the tax; 54 (2) those affecting
the amount of estate and income taxes;55 and (3) those relating to the
discharge of executors and other fiduciaries from personal liability for
federal taxes.5 6 The period after which fiduciaries may be discharged
from personal liability for estate taxes and after which executors may be
discharged from personal liability for income and gift taxes is reduced
from one year to nine months effective with respect to decedents
dying after December 31, 1973.57 With this exception, the estate tax
provisions apply in cases of decedents dying after December 3 1,
1970.58
A. Changes in the Mechanics of Filing Returns and Paying the Tax
The principal change in this category shortened the period within
which the estate tax return must be filed from fifteen months to nine
months after death. 59 As the estate tax must ordinarily be paid when
the return is due, the change served also to advance the payment
date to nine months after death. 60 Other changes lengthen the period
by which District Directors may extend the time for payment of the
estate tax under section 6161(a) from six months to one year and
give the Service authority to require estate tax returns to be filed either
in the internal revenue district of the decedent's domicile at the time
project. The first phase, expected to cost $5 million, will add a deck of seats on the
Bluff Road or west side of the stadium and increase the seating capacity by 14,456
seats.
Id. Earlier the South Carolina General Assembly had authorized the trustees of the Uni-
versity to issue $5 million in bonds to finance the construction of an addition to the
stadium. Prior to the addition the stadium was reputed to have a seating capacity of
43,000. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, BULLETIN A-19 (1970).
54. IRC §§ 6075(a), 6161(a) and 6091(b).
55. Id. §§ 2032, 2055(b)(2)(C), and 1223.
56. Id. §§ and 2204 and 6905. Section 6905 was added by the Act.
57. Id. §§ 2204, 6905.
58. Excise, Estate and Gift Tax Adjustment Act of 1970, § 101j., 84 Stat. 1838.
59. IRC § 607 5 (a).
60. Id. § 615 1(a), which provides that the tax shown by a return to be due must be
paid "at the time and place fixed for filing the return (determined without regard to any
extension of time for filing the return)."
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of his death or with the regional service center for that district.61 Sec-
tion 6091(b)(3) formerly required returns to be filed in the district in
which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death.
1. Advance of the Filing and Payment Date
The change in the filing and payment date is responsible for the
expected $1.5 billion increase in estate tax collections for fiscal 1972,62
and is the raison d'etre for most of the other provisions relating to
the estate tax.63 The advance required that some change be made in
the sections of the Code dealing with the alternate valuation date64
and the designation of a charitable appointee by a surviving spouse. 65
At the instance of the Trust Division and the Tax Section, Congress
concluded that the advance also justified, if not required, the amend-
ment of several other Code sections. In particular, Congress was
urged to liberalize the holding period rules applicable to property
acquired from a decedent, 66 to lengthen the period for which exten-
sions may be granted under section 6161(a), and to broaden and relax
the rules relating to the discharge of fiduciaries from personal liability
for a decedent's taxes. 67
61. Id. § 6091(b)(3). The Act also amended section 6091(b)(4) to continue to permit
hand carried returns to be filed in the district of the decedent's domicile at the time of his
death. See notes 93-94 and accompanying text, infra.
62. See note 8 and accompanying text, supra. The statement Secretary Kennedy
submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee indicated that $1.5 billion of addi-
tional estate taxes would be collected in fiscal 1971 if the alternate estate tax accelera-
tion proposal were adopted and estate tax returns of persons dying prior to September
30, 1970 were required to be filed no later than June 15, 1971, 9 months after death, and
the returns of persons dying after September 30, 1970 were required to be filed 9
months after death. 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 43-44. Based upon the De-
cember 31, 1970 effective date specified in the Act, the committee reports stated that
[I] t is expected that the shortening of the period for the payment of the estate tax
will result in an increase in tax collections in the fiscal year 1972 of $1,500 million.
The shortening of the filing and payment periods for estate tax are expected to in-
crease receipts in fiscal year 1972 by six months' estate tax collections.
1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 3; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
63. 116 CONG. REC. H 11557 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1970) (remarks of Congressman
Mills).
64. IRC § 2032.
65. Id. § 2055(b)(2).
66. Id. § 1223 (11).
67. Id. §8 2204, 6905. These changes were proposed in the statements the Trust Di-
vision of the American Bankers Association and the Tax Section of the American Bar
Association submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee. 1970 Tax Hearings,
supra note 4, at 236, 248.
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The advance also affects provisions of the Code which require the
performance of acts "before the date prescribed for the filing of the
estate tax return," such as sections 2053, 2055 and 2056. Under sec-
tion 2053(c)(2) funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims and
debts in excess of the amount of property subject to claims must be
"paid before the date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return,"
in order to be allowable as deductions. Under section 2055(a) a dis-
claimer in favor of a charitable organization must be made before the
return is due in order for the estate to be entitled to a charitable de-
duction for the value of property passing to the charity pursuant to the
disclaimer. Finally, under section 2056(d) a disclaimer by or in favor
of a surviving spouse must be made within that time to be given effect
for estate tax purposes.
With respect to the revenue effect of the advance, the committee
reports stated that it would result in a revenue saving "attributable to
the decreased interest costs from having these funds available earlier
in each year from now on." 68 Actually, this is not an additional saving
but merely indicates the economic value of the advance to the federal
fisc. The correlative economic cost devolves on the estate-tax-paying
public.
Viewed from the taxpayer's perspective, the advance in the pay-
ment date is equivalent to an across-the-board increase in estate tax
rates. 69 The advance will deprive payors of the use of the amount of
the tax six months earlier than before. Stated generally, the advance
will cost an estate at least the yield the estate would have received on
the amount of the tax over the six month period of the advance. Thus,
if an estate were to earn a return of six percent per annum on the
funds, the advance will cost one-half of the annual return, or three
percent of the amount of the tax. A determination of the actual cost in
any case would have to take into account the additional income taxes,
fiduciaries' commissions, attorney's fees and other costs which would
be incurred by reason of the receipt of the return from the fund over
68. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 3; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 3.
69. This aspect of both the original and the alternate acceleration proposals was re-
ferred to at the hearings by spokesmen for various groups: "The new proposal still rep-
resents a tax increase for all estates affected. . . .While the tax increase under this pro-
posal might be slightly less than under the original proposal, it is still a significant and
discriminatory feature of the acceleration process." 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at
143. "The payment acceleration proposals are actually estate and gift tax rate increases
in disquise [sicl ." Id. at 249 (Statement of the Tax Section of the American Bar Ass'n).
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the six month period. In some ,cases the advance in payment date
would probably also involve costs which are not susceptible of meas-
urement, such as the loss of investment opportunities over the period
of the advance and losses and increased costs caused by the forced
earlier liquidation of assets. All in all, the cost to taxpayers may far
exceed the benefit to the Government.
Proponents of the advance also heralded it as "a real reform in the
administration of estates."'70 The Congressional committees reported
that it was "designed to decrease the period of estate administration
and to facilitate a more rapid distribution of property to the benefici-
aries."' In this respect their enthusiasm for the proposal may have
resulted in some exaggeration. By hastening the process of settling
estate tax liabilities the advance will facilitate the attainment of those
goals, but it does not assure that they will be attained.72 The advance
will reduce the extent to which the federal tax laws actually are the
cause of delay in the settlement of estates and the extent to which they
may legitimately be cited as the cause of delay. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the changes made by the Act will shorten the length
of time estates are under administration.73 Perhaps the impact of the
changes on the time taken to settle estates will be assessed in a later
empirical study.74
70. 116 CONG. REc. H 11556-57 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1970) (remarks of Congressman
Mills).
71. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 5; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 5.
72. "These changes, along with new procedures to be adopted by the IRS, will speed
up estate administration, at least as far as the tax audit goes." TRUST DEPARTMENT OF
THE BANK OF CALIFORNIA, ESTATE PLANNING BRIEFS (Feb. 1971) (emphasis added).
73. The length of time required to settle an estate reflects a serious deficiency in our
system of estate administration. That and other deficiencies were parlayed by Norman
Dacey into a national best-seller, How To AVOID PROBATE (1965).
Dacey's charges were quite specific and quite serious. He asserted that probate law
and procedure are archaic, needlessly complex, and exist principally for the benefit
of lawyers and probate judges. As a result, succession through probate is terribly
time-consuming and costly ...
Unfortunately, from the view of those who dislike Dacey's charges, there is much
in them that cannot be denied, particularly if we focus on the estate of modest size
and the relationships most commonly encountered in succession. Probate laws in
almost all of our states, including some with recently adopted codes, are undeni-
ably obsolescent.
Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44
IND. LJ. 191, 192-93 (1969),
A recent study of a sample of probate estates closed in Cuyhoga County, Ohio, in
1965 indicated that the majority of persons interested in decedents' estates were dis-
turbed by the length of time the estates were under administration. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES &
D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 260-61 (1970).
74. Although decedents' estates have been the subject of a few empirical studies,
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The changes made by the Act cannot overcome the obstacles that
cumbersome and often archaic state estate administration procedures
and estate tax laws place in the way of the early settlement of estates. 75
With the advance in the payment date for federal estate tax as a
precedent, the states may advance the date for payment of their death
taxes.76 The pressure to advance the state death tax payment dates
may be irresistible. Such action offers a relatively non-controversial
means of augmenting current revenue 77 and possibly also removes one
of the obstacles to the earlier settlement of estates. Some professional
taxes are infrequently mentioned. The studies have been principally concerned with the
composition of the decedent population, the nature of its assets, and the distribution of
its property. See, e.g., Powell & Looker, Decedent's Estates, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 919
(1930); Browder, Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and Eng-
land, 67 MlicH. L. REV. 1303 (1969); Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of
Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 241 (1963); Ward & Beuscher, The
Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 393. The study of a sample of pro-
bate estates closed in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, in 1965 conducted by two sociologists
and a law professor confirms many of the conclusions reached in earlier studies and
adds some useful data, particularly with respect to the views of the participants in the
estate settlement process. M. SUSSMIAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH. THE FAMILY AND INHERI-
TANCE (1970). However, as the title indicates, it was not concerned with tax mat-
ters. Some of the Brookings Institution studies of Government Finance are concerned
with the impact of death taxes and provide a wealth of statistical data regarding them.
See G. JANTSCHER, TRUSTS AND ESTATE TAXATION (1967); C. SHOUP. FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES (1966).
75. The obstacles created by local laws and the need for their modernization is well
known:
Although expediting federal estate tax procedures will accelerate the federal tax
aspects of estate administration to a considerable extent, there remains a need to
modernize local probate and state death tax procedures. Trustmen should work
with local and state bar associations so as to shorten applicable probate claim peri-
ods, the time for filing inventories and accountings, the time for renunciations,
and the time for the filing, payment and audit of state death tax returns. Shortening
the time for probate should make probate administration more efficient and permit
corporate fiduciaries to provide an improved service to beneficiaries of estates.
Stevens, Estate Tax Acceleration Promotes Efficient Administration, 110 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 168, 171 (1971); Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible A nswer to
Probate A voidance, 44 IND. L.J. 191 (1968).
76. For example, the date for payment of the Washington inheritance tax was ad-
vanced from 15 months to 9 months after death during the 1971 Extraordinary Session
of the legislature. Ch. 132 [19711 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 667.
77. The advances which were made in the early 1960's by New Jersey and New
York led to substantial one-time increases in the yield of their death taxes.
Prior to 1962 the New Jersey law allowed the inheritance tax to be paid within one
year of death without imposing an interest charge. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:35-3 (1960). In
1962 the law was amended to impose an interest charge of 10% per annum if the tax
was not paid within 8 months after death. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:35-3 (1969 Supp.). At
the same time the inheritance tax rates were increased. N.J. STAT. ANN., § 54:34-2 (1969
Supp.). The total New Jersey death tax collections increased from $24.6 million in 1962
to $41.8 million in 1963. N.J. DEPT. OF TREAS. (TAX. Div.) ANN. REP. 96 (1963). While
the published data does not provide a basis upon which the increase can be allocated
between the advance in payment date and the increase in rates, a substantial portion of
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fiduciaries advocate an advance of the state payment dates for the
latter reason.75 In order to achieve the economies which would result
if state and federal death tax returns were prepared and filed at the
same time some professional fiduciaries might support movements to
make state death taxes due at or about the same time as the federal
estate tax. Attention given this subject may also serve to spur interest
in the revision of estate administration laws.
The Tax Section of the American Bar Association was probably too
optimistic when it suggested that a substantial reduction in estate
administration expense might follow if the alternative acceleration
proposal was adopted and the period allowed for audit was short-
ened.79 Although methods of reducing the cost of estate administra-
tion should be earnestly pursued, it seems unlikely that any politically
the increase was probably attributable to the advance in payment date. One can infer
than an advance of 4 months, or 1/3 of the period during which collections are received
in a fiscal year, would increase collections by roughly / of the amount collected in the
preceding fiscal year. On that basis, the advance in payment date was responsible for
slightly more than $5.7 million of the total increase of $17.2 million.
Until April, 1964 the estate tax law of New York allowed a discount of 5% for tax
payments made within 6 months of the date of death. In 1964 the New York law was
amended effective April 1, 1964 to provide that an interest charge would be imposed
unless at least 80% of the tax finally determined to be due was paid within 6 months of
the date of death (the percentage was 90% for decedents dying before April 1, 1965,
85% for those dying before April 1, 1966, and 80% for those dying on or after April 1,
1966). N.Y. TAX LAW § 249-z (McKinney Supp. 1969).
The 1963-64 and 1964-65 annual reports of the New York State Tax Commission
indicate that the change in the payment date may have been responsible for a substantial
portion of the amount by which the 1964 estate tax collections exceeded the 1963 collec-
tions. In the fiscal year ending March 31, 1963 $91.3 million was collected, in 1964
$111.1 million was collected and in 1965 $106.4 million. The fluctuations are attribut-
able to the combined effect of the advance in payment date, a probable normal annual
increase due to inflation and an increase in the number of deaths and the abolition of the
discount for payments made within 6 months of death.
The change in the federal law will almost certainly lead to corresponding changes by
the states which only impose a "pick-up" tax (a death tax equal in amount to the max-
imum credit allowed under the federal estate tax law for state death tax payments). In-
cluded in that category are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida and Georgia. CCH INH. EST. &
Giir TAX REP., 70,111, 70,141, 70,201 and 70,211. Some of the states which now
allow more than 9 months for payment of their death taxes will probably also change
their laws to require the taxes to be paid within 9 or fewer months. For example, the
present laws of Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and
Utah allow payments to be made within fifteen months following death. Id. at 7 70,181,
70,301, 70,321, 70,491, 70,551, 70,561 and 70,571. As indicated, the date for payment
of the Washington inheritance tax was recently advanced from 15 months to 9 months
after death. See note 76, supra. California and Vermont, which allow 2 years for
the payment of death taxes, will almost certainly advance those dates. CCH INH. EST. &
GIFT TAX REP. 7 70,151 and 70,581.
78. Stevens, Estate Tax Acceleration Promotes Efficient Administration, 110 TRUSTs
& ESTATES 168, 171 (1971).
79. Tax Section Statement, supra note 23, at 687.
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feasible changes in the federal estate and gift tax laws would have
such a result. Shortening the period during which an estate is under
administration would probably not significantly reduce the amount of
executors' commissions and attorneys' fees which are usually the larg-
est administration expense. Shortening the audit period would surely
not affect the amount of those items in jurisdictions where commis-
sions and fees are determined by reference to the inventory or princi-
pal value of estates.80
2. Extensions of Time
Section 101(h) 81 of the Act lengthens the period by which District
Directors may extend the time for payment of the estate tax from six
months to one year. The change was intended to compensate for the
advance of the tax payment date by lengthening the permissible exten-
sion period by a similar period.82
The House and Senate Committees also made it clear that exten-
sions of time under section 6161 (a)(1) should be made more generally
available and should not be limited by the Service to cases involving
"undue hardship." The Committees noted the previous administrative
practice of so limiting the availability of extensions and obtained an
undertaking from the "Treasury Department that extensions of time
80. To the extent that commissions and fees are computed on the income received
by an estate, a reduction would take place if a change in the estate tax law caused an
earlier distribution of income-producing assets of estates. In 21 states (including Wash-
ington) the gross income of an estate during probate is not included in the base upon
which attorneys' fees are computed. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PROBATE COUNSEL, ATrOR-
NEYS' FEES IN PROBATE (1967). Gross income is included in the fee base in 18 states
and the District of Columbia; the practice in II states is unclear. Id. The data for this
pamphlet was compiled by Harold 1. Boucher, a partner in the San Francisco law firm
of Pillsbury, Madison and Sutro. It is amusing that the publication bears a legend in
bold face type worthy of a warranty disclaimer which reads "Personal--Confidential.'
81. IRC § 6161(a)(1). The provision was not included in the administration's draft
proposals, but was added by the House Ways and Means Committee at the suggestion of
the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association and the Tax Section of the
American Bar Association. See text accompanying notes 66-67, supra.
82. The committee believes that any problems which may occur as a result of
shortening this period of time from 15 to 9 months for the filing of the return and
the payment of the tax can be eliminated by increasing the maximum extension of time
available for the payment of the estate tax where there is reasonable cause from 6
to 12 months. As a result of this change an estate obtaining an extension of 12
months for the payment of the estate tax will have the same 21 month period after
the date of the decedent's death for the payment of the estate tax as is available
under present law where the 6 month extension of time is granted.
1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 10-11; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 11.
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will be made available in the future under this provision (sec.
6161(a)(1)) on a more liberal basis than in the past and that in the
future they will be available whenever there is reasonable cause. '83
Extensions will continue to be available under other provisions of the
Code on the same bases as before. Thus, a showing of undue hardship
will continue to be necessary in order to obtain an extension under
section 6161(a)(2).
The Committees' statement of their understanding of the specific
cases in which the Internal Revenue Service would grant extensions
give some indication of the liberality with which extensions are to be
granted under section 6161(a)(1). 84 In the future the Service is to
grant an extension, limited to the amount of the cash shortage, where
(1) a gross estate includes a farm or closely held business which could
be sold to unrelated persons at its fair market value but instead the
executor seeks an extension in order to raise funds for the payment of
the tax from other sources; 85 (2) an estate includes sufficient liquid
funds but they are located in several jurisdictions and cannot be mar-
shalled by the executor within the time allowed for payment of the
tax; (3) an estate is composed in substantial part of assets in the form
of payments to be received in the future, such as royalties or annuities,
which cannot be borrowed upon except upon terms which would in-
flict loss upon the estate; (4) an estate includes a claim to substantial
assets which cannot be collected without litigation; (5) the assets of
the estate which must be liquidated to pay the tax must be sold at a
sacrifice or in a depressed market;8 6 and (6) an estate does not,
without borrowing at a rate of interest higher than that which is gen-
erally available, have sufficient funds to pay the entire tax and at the
same time to provide a reasonable amount for the support of the sur-
viving spouse and dependent children and to satisfy claims against the
estate. It was also agreed that the Service would institute a procedure
under which an executor whose request for an extension under section
6161 (a)(1) was denied by a District Director could appeal the decision
to the Office of the Regional Commissioner.87
83. Id.
84. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 11-12; 1970S. REP., supra note 3, at 11-12.
85. This also constitutes a ground of undue hardship under Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-
1(b) (1958), as amendedT.D. 6736, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 489.
86. Essentially the same circumstances constitute a ground of undue hardship. Id.
87. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 12; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 12.
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The liberalization of the rules under which extensions of time will
be granted under section 6161(a)(1) will provide some relief for es-
tates which have a serious liquidity problem but for which the timely
payment of the tax would not constitute "undue hardship." However,
because of the differential in the applicable interest rates, it will con-
tinue to be more advantageous for estates to obtain extensions of time
under section 6161 (a)(2). Amounts with respect to which an extension
is granted under that section are subject to interest at the rate of four
percent per annum rather than the generally applicable six percent
rate.88 The six percent rate will continue to apply to amounts with
respect to which an extension is granted for reasonable cause under
section 6161(a)(1). An extension under any provision would, of
course, avoid the imposition of an addition to tax under section
665 1(a)(2). The addition to tax provisions imposes an additional tax
of 0.5 percent of the amount of the tax for each month a tax payment
is delinquent up to a maximum of 25 percent, unless the failure to pay
was due to reasonable cause and not due to wilful neglect. 89 If an ex-
tension of time to pay a portion of the estate tax is granted, the exec-
utor may be required to post a bond not exceeding double the amount
with respect to which the time to pay was extended. 90
In the estate planning context, the liberalized extension rules should
be viewed primarily as imparting a slightly greater degree of flexibility
to the post mortem planning process. They are not a substitute for the
planning which should be done during a client's lifetime. Although
they may offer some relief from liquidation problems arising from
failures in lifetime planning, the liberalized rules will likely not offer
much relief from oversights or failures to exercise due diligence during
the administration of an estate. The costs and delays which inhere in
extensions dictate that they be resorted to only when actually needed
and when an extension would be of real advantage to the estate.
88. IRC § 6601.
89. The addition to tax provisions was enacted as a part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969 in order to discourage taxpayers from filing returns but then failing to pay the tax
when due. The prior law imposed only an interest charge of 6 percent per annum on the
unpaid amount of tax and imposed no penalty.
Since the current cost of borrowing money is substantially in excess of the 6 per-
cent interest rate provided by the code, it is to the advantage of taxpayers in many
cases to file a return on the due date but not to pay the tax shown as owing on the
return. For the period the tax remains unpaid, the taxpayer is borrowing from the
Government the amount of the tax at a 6 percent rate of interest.
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 297-298 (1969).
90. IRC § 6165.
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3. Place of Filing
The Act also made some minor changes in section 6091, which
deals with the place of filing estate tax returns. It allows the Service to
provide that estate tax returns should be filed with the internal rev-
enue district in which a decedent was domiciled at the time of his
death or with a service center serving the district.91 Previously, the
Code did not permit the Service to vary the place of filing for domicil-
ary decedents. 92 The general instructions pinted on the July 1971
revision of the estate tax return (form 706) direct that the return for a
resident decedent.must be filed at the regional office listed for the state
in which the decedent had his domicile at the time of his death.
The amendment of the filing provisions seems worthwhile. The shift
to a requirement that estate tax returns be filed with the regional
service centers might expedite the processing of returns at little or no
inconvenience to taxpayers. If the requirement does not prove benefi-
cial, the Service can revert to the old rule. Notwithstanding the
change, estate tax returns may continue to be hand delivered within
the district of a decedent's domicile at death.93 "This aspect is con-
sidered important by executors who want verification of their timely
filing and payments in order to avoid any danger of a penalty for late
filing."94
91. The administration's original proposal did not include this provision. See 1970
Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 17-27. However, it was part of the draft bill which Secre-
tary Kennedy submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee on September 9,
1970. Draft Bill § 3(e), Id. at 60.
92. Prior to the amendment, IRC § 6091(b)(3) provided:
Returns of estate tax required under section 6018 shall be made to the Secretary or
his delegate in the internal revenue district in which was the domicile of the dece-
dent at the time of his death or, if there was no such domicile in an internal revenue
district, then at such place as the Secretary or his delegate may by regulations pre-
scribe.
93. IRC § 6091(b)(4). A hand carried return is defined in the regulations as one
which is
brought to the district director by the person required to file the return or other
documents, or by his agent. Examples of persons who will be considered to be
agents for the purposes of the preceding sentence are: Members of the taxpayer's
family, an employee of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's attorney, accountant or other
tax adviser, and messengers employed by the taxpayer. A return or document will
not be considered to be hand carried if it is sent to the Internal Revenue Service
through the U.S. Mail.
Treas. Reg. §301.6091-1(c), T.D. 7012, 34 Fed. Reg. 7697.
94. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 12; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 13.
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B. Changes Affecting the Amount of Estate and Income Taxes
The Act made three changes which more or less directly affect the
amount of federal taxes which will be due by reason of an individual's
death. Section 2032 was amended to change the alternate valuation
date from one year to six months after death, section 2055(b)(2) was
amended to reduce similarly the period within which an octogenarian
surviving spouse may designate the charities to which he will appoint
remainder interests in property included in his spouse's gross estate
and thereby entitle the estate to a charitable deduction, and the
holding period rules of section 1223 were amended to provide that
property acquired from a decedent and sold or exchanged within six
months of his death shall be considered to have been held for more
than six months.
1. Advance of the Alternate Valuation Date
The advance of the filing and payment date required that the alter-
nate valuation date be similarly advanced to avoid making changes in
the relatively simple alternate valuation procedures. Accordingly, the
Act amended section 2032 to advance the alternate valuation date to
six months after death. As a result of the change executors will con-
tinue to have three months following the alternate valuation date
within which to file the estate tax return and pay the tax.95
The exercise of the election, which fixes the valuation of assets for
estate tax purposes, affects the size of the gross estate and, thereby,
the amount of estate tax liability. As the estate tax valuation of assets
also establishes their bases for income tax purposes, the election also
affects the income tax liability of estates and distributees. Because the
valuation of assets on the old and new alternate valuation dates will
seldom be the same, executors will obviously be faced with quantita-
tively different elections than they formerly were.96 However, the Act
95. IRC § 2032 requires that the alternate valuation election be made by the execu-
tor on the return, which must be filed within the time prescribed, including any exten-
sions.
96. The advance of the filing and payment date may have reduced the need to
provide an alternate valuation election. The alternate valuation procedure was added to
the Code in 1935 to prevent estates from being entirely consumed by the estate tax in
the event of a sudden economic decline. See note 101, infra. Assuming that the valuation
of assets made longer after death will deviate from the date of death valuation more than
262
Vol. 47: 237, 1972
Tax Legislation
did not change section 2032 in any other respect. Thus the considera-
tions which impel a decision regarding the exercise of the election
remain the same, as do the consequences of the exercise of the elec-
tion.
The advance, coupled with the advance of the filing and payment
date and the change in the holding period rules,97 facilitates the earlier
distribution and sale of estate assets and may also improve the effi-
ciency of estate administration and the quality of some post mortem
planning. Estate assets may now be sold, exchanged or distributed six
months earlier than under the old alternate valuation date without
affecting their estate tax valuation.98 The earlier distribution, sale or
exchange of assets (including redemptions under section 303) will be
encouraged because the income tax bases of assets will be known, at
an equally early time.99 The efficiency of estate administration should
also be improved because the estate administration process should be
more continuous than before. Previously, estate administrations were
often characterized by two bursts of rather intensive activity, one
shortly after death and one a year later, shortly after the alternate val-
uation date. By halving the length of the interval between those pe-
riods of activity the advances should encourage the more productive
use of the interval and should reduce the need of those involved in the
process to re-educate themselves about an estate after the alternate
date has passed.
The advance should increase the quality of some post mortem tax
valuations made sooner after death, the protection afforded by the alternate valuation
method is less necessary as the alternate valuation date is advanced. By narrowing the
difference between date of death valuation and alternate date valuation, the advance
may also be viewed as reducing the significance of the election as a means of achieving
the optimum tax advantage from the option.
97. For the discussion of these two topics see, respectively, text accompanying notes
70-74, supra, and text accompanying notes 117-20, infra.
98. If the alternate valuation date is elected, assets distributed, sold, or otherwise
disposed of within the valuation period are valued as of the date of distribution, sale or
disposition. IRC § 2032(a)(1).
99. The income tax consequences arising from the sale or exchange of assets is af-
fected by the valuation of assets because the amount of gain or loss is determined by ref-
erence to their estate tax valuation. The amount of gain or loss recognized upon certain
distributions, such as distributions of assets in kind in satisfaction of pecuniary legacies
is similarly determined by reference to their estate tax valuation. Under IRC § 1014 the
income tax bases of assets distributed by an estate or.otherwise acquired from a dece-
dent are normally determined in the same way. The valuation of assets also determines
whether an estate may avail itself of the special tax payment extension provisions of sec-
tion 6166.
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planning in the sense that it can now take place at an earlier time than
before. The income tax consequences flowing from the sale, exchange
or distribution of particular assets made more than six months after
death can now be projected with reliability. Also, by having the alter-
nate valuation of assets in hand at an earlier time, and thereby know-
ing the extent of any gains the estate has realized or will realize upon
the sale, exchange or distribution of assets, executors can make a
more intelligent selection of an income tax year for the estate. If an
income tax year is carefully selected, capital gains and other income
of an estate can be spread over the maximum number of taxable pe-
riods. The connection between the valuation of assets and the selec-
tion of an income tax year for an estate suggests that an income tax
year should normally not be adopted which would require an income
tax return to be filed prior to the alternate valuation date. 100
It seems unlikely that the alternate valuation provisions, which
have been in effect since 1935,101 will be materially changed in the
forseeable future. The possibility of eliminating the alternate valuation
option was raised during the hearings on the Act and was rejected by
100. The trustee of a revocable trust may similarly select any taxable year he
chooses for the trust upon the grantor's death, where the fiduciary income tax returns
filed prior to death were information returns and all of the income of the trust prior to
the grantor's death was reported by and taxed to him. Rev. Rul. 57-51, 1957-1 Cust.
BULL. 171.
Upon the death of the grantor the trust became a separate entity for Federal in-
come tax purposes for the first time and hence a new taxpayer. Therefore, the
trustee may elect to file the first return for the trust either on the basis of a calendar
year or a fiscal year without the consent of the Commissioner, provided it fulfills
the other requirements of a taxpayer filing its first return. For tax purposes, the ex-
istence of the trust in this case, prior to the time it became irrevocable, is ignored.
Id. The income tax return of an estate or trust must be filed on or before the fifteenth
day of the fourth month following the close of its taxable year. IRC § 6072(a). Those
provisions interrelate with the alternate valuation date rules as follows: The first income
tax return of the estate of a decedent dying during the first 15 days of any month need
not be filed prior to the alternate valuation date if the estate adopts a tax year ending on
the last day of the third month following death or later; in the case of a decedent dying
after the fifteenth day of any month the first return need not be filed prior to the
alternate valuation date if his estate adopts a taxable year ending on the last day of
the fourth month following his death or later.
101. Revenue Act of 1935, § 202, 49 Stat. 1022. The drop in property values which
took place during the depression of the 1930's led to several proposals for the relief of
estates. The legislative history of the alternate valuation option is summarized in the fol-
lowing passage:
As originally proposed, the 1935 Act would have allowed an additional deduction
covering the shrinkage in value. In conference, this was changed to give the exec-
utor an election with respect to the time as of which the property included in the
gross estate is to be valued. See H.R. Rep. No. 1885 (Conf.), 74th Cong., 1st Sess..
p. 10. The inclusion of the alternate valuation provision in the 1935 Act was in-
tended to prevent "in practically all cases the danger of complete confiscation of
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the administration's spokesman.' 0 2 The improbability of a major
change is also indicated by the fact that neither the estate and gift tax
recommendations of the American Law Institute, 03 nor the Treasury
Department's 1969 estate and gift tax reform proposals 04 proposed
any amendment of section 2032. Indeed, inertia and the apparent sat-
isfaction of all concerned with the present provisions of section 2032
suggest that it will probably not be changed at all for some time.1 05
estates due to a sudden decline in market values." See S. REP. No. 1240, 74th
Cong., lst Sess., p. 9.
H.R. 10236, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), which finally became the 1932 Act, con-
tained a provision granting relief retroactively to estates whose assets greatly de-
creased in value subsequent to their valuation for estate tax purposes as of the date
of death, the privilege being extended to have the estate valued as of a date 18
months subsequent to the date of death in the case of a decedent who died on or
after September 1, 1928, and prior to January 1, 1932. On the basis of express so-
licitude for state revenues, as well as those of the Federal Government, the Senate
struck this provision from the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p.
50; S. REP. No. 665,72d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 54.
2 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 3, n.3 (1959).
102. See 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 89-90 (discussing possible revenue
losses from the use of the alternate valuation date). The Treasury Department should
assemble the necessary data and project the loss in revenue which the new six-month
alternate valuation date entails. With this information, one could balance the revenue
cost of the provision against its benefit to taxpayers.
103. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1969).
104. STAFFS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND THE SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, U.S. TREAS. DEPT., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1969).
105. At some future time, the possibility of reducing the three month interval be-
tween the alternate valuation date and the filing and payment date should be explored.
It would probably not be politically feasible to advance the filing and payment date closer
to the alternate valuation date, but it might be possible to move the alternate valuation
date back, closer to the filing and payment date. Because it is convenient to have as
much time after the alternate valuation date as possible to prepare the federal estate tax
return and to raise funds with which to pay the tax, the bar and professional fiduciaries
might well oppose such a change. However, because of the existing degree of familiarity
with the alternate valuation rules and technological advances, such as machine book-
keeping systems and generally available duplicating services, the period which was re-
luired in 1935 to give an opportunity to take advantage of the alternate valuation op-
tion may no longer be needed. "In order to give an opportunity to take advantage of
this provision [alternate valuation], the due date of the tax is extended for a period of 3
months, that is, from 1 year after death to 15 months after death." S. REP. No. 1240,
74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935), reprinted at 19394 CUM. BULL. 651, 656.
From the estate administration point of view a reduction of one month would appear
practicable. A considerable amount of the work required to prepare an estate tax return
can be done prior to the alternate valuation date. Also, it would not actually reduce the
period during which assets might be sold. In this connection it is pertinent to note that
the holding period rules were amended by the Act to facilitate the sale of assets in the six
months immediately following death. Finally, a reduction of the interval would increase
the probability that the amount of tax paid will not be a greater percentage of the value
of the assets of an estate on the payment date than it was on the alternate valuation date.
The last statement is based upon two assumptions. One is that changes in value are more
likely to take place over a longer, rather than a shorter period of time. The other is that,
as nearly as possible, the amount of tax paid should bear the same relationship to the
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2. Reduction in the Period During Which a Charitable Appointee
May Be Designated Under Section 2055(b)(2)
The amendment of this relatively unimportant Code provision is
noted here for the sake of completeness and to urge that it be re-
pealed. Section 2055(b)(2) was added to the Code on August 6, 1956
for the apparent purpose of benefiting one estate. 10 6 The character
and content of the 1956 provision is perhaps best summarized in the
following passage: 107
If the decedent's surviving spouse is over 80 years of age at the dece-
dent's death, is entitled to the life income of a testamentary trust, and
"has a power of appointment over the corpus of such trust, exercisable
by will in favor of, among others, organizations [qualifying for the
charitable deduction]," the value of the trust remainder is deductible
in the decedent's estate. In order to qualify for the deduction, the sur-
viving spouse must execute an affidavit within one year after the
decedent's death specifying the organizations to which he intends to
appoint and the amounts or proportions each organization is to re-
ceive. The deduction is subject to disallowance, however, if the power
is not actually exercised in accordance with the affidavit, or if any part
of the corpus "is distributed to a beneficiary during the life of the sur-
value of the assets of the estate on the payment date as it does to their value on the alter-
nate valuation date.
106. 70 Stat. 1075. The provision was made retroactively applicable to August 16.
1954. Id.
It has been reported that the provision was enacted to reduce the estate tax liability of
the estate of Mary Hill Swope, the wife of a former president of General Electric, by S4
million. P. STERN, THE GREAT TREASURY RAID 49 (1964); Surrey, The Congress and the
Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147
n.4 (1957). If legislative relief was to be provided the estate of Mary Swope, it should
have taken the form of a private bill. The codification of a relief measure, which is often
undertaken to conceal the identity of its intended beneficiaries, is particularly objection-
able:
The technical amendment form has distinct disadvantages. The coverage, and
therefore the revenue cost, of a technical amendment will generally exceed that of
a private bill. Technical amendments also introduce further complexity into the
Code simply by adding to that already lengthy statute another detailed provision
which lawyers must learn to ignore. Ad hoc technical amendments may also create
special problems of interpretation for courts; because underinclusive classifications
are pften employed and the purposes of ad hoc provisions are often either unclear
or inconsistent with broader tax policy, the process of reasoned judicial elaboration
may be extremely difficult. In contrast, private bills are limited in scope to the
beneficiaries they name and present no real difficulties of interpretation. Since pri-
vate bills are not codified, they add no complexity to the Code.
Note, Tax Equity and Ad Hoc Tax Legislation, 84 HARV. L. REV. 640, 656-57 (1971).
107. 4 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §
59.08, at 11 (1970).
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viving spouse. . ... This crassly conceived and crudely drawn statute
leaves many unsettled questions for the few taxpayers to whom it may
apply.
In Miller v. Commissioner'0 8 the court suggested that the Commis-
sioner petition Congress for resolution of the complex problems "cur-
rently unanswered in the 'special legislatioft' of §2055(b)(2)."' 0 9 In
that opinion the court also referred to the "[c] ryptic legislative report
accompanying passage of the 1956 amendments" and described the
provision as a "badly drafted subsection."' 0
The advance of the filing and payment date provided for in the Act
made it necessary to change section 2055(b)(2) in some respect. Con-
sidering the lack of justification for the provision, its complexity and
patent discriminatory character, the absurd results it has spawned and
its conflict with provisions added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the
administration should have sought its repeal."' Instead the adminis-
tration merely recommended that the time allowed the surviving
108. 400 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1968).
109. Id. at 413. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also recently described
section 2055(b)(2) as having "all the earmarks of special legislation." Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 439 F.2d 931, 933 n.3 (2d Cir. 1971).
110. Miller, 400 F.2d at 412.
I 11. The absurdity of the provision is better illustrated by the results which were
reached in Miller than by any hypothetical which might be stated. Mrs. Miller died in
1960 survived by her 84 year old husband for whom her will established a trust which
met the requirements of section 2056 and over the corpus of which her husband was
given a general testamentary power of appointment. Mr. Miller complied with the re-
quirements of section 2055(b)(2), and Mrs. Miller's estate claimed both a marital deduc-
tion for the property transferred to the trust and a deduction for the charitable re-
mainder interest in the same property. The double deduction was allowed by the Tax
Court and upheld on appeal. Estate of Edna Allen Miller, 48 T.C. 251 (1967), affd, 400
F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1968). Upon Mr. Miller's death, the corpus of the trust was included in
his gross estate under section 2041 and his estate claimed a charitable deduction under
section 2055(b)(1) for the value of the remainder interest he appointed to charity in his
will in accordance with the affidavit he had executed under section 2055(b)(2). The Tax
Court disallowed the deduction on the ground that the previous allowance of a deduc-
tion to the wife's estate for the remainder interest under the special provisions of section
2055(b)(2), precluded the allowance of a deduction to the husband's estate under the
general rule of section 2055(b)(1), but the court of appeals reversed. Estate of Hugh
Gordon Miller, 48 T.C. 265 (1967), rev'd, 400 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1968). Although the
Tax Court and the court of appeals characterized the results as "anomolous," 48 T.C. at
264, and "absurd," 400 F.2d at 412, Congress has since taken no direct action which
would prevent the future allowance of triple deductions in similar circumstances. As
will be discussed, the limitations which the Tax Reform Act of 1969 imposed on the
deduction of charitable remainder interests under section 2055(e)(2) would seem to pre-
vent the estate of the first spouse to die from obtaining a charitable deduction under sec-
tion 2055(b)(2) for the remainder interest in property the decedent transferred to a mar-
ital deduction trust. See text accompanying notes 114-116, infra.
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spouse to execute the required affidavit be reduced from one year to
six months.' 12 The change proposed by the administration was carried
forward into the Act.113
The limitations which the Tax Reform Act of 1969 imposed on the
deductibility of charitable remainder interests are inconsistent with the
provisions of section 2055(b)(2) and may have already eliminated the
future allowance of deductions under it. 1 14 In particular, the limita-
tions which the Tax Reform Act imposed on the deductibility of chari-
table remainder interests in split interest trusts (those which have both
charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries) for estate tax purposes
under section 2055(e)(2), seem to prohibit the allowance of a deduc-
In the Miller cases both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit invited Congress to change or repeal section 2055(b)(2):
This or any other court should consequently hesitate to select the single appropriate
statutory scheme, particularly when such factors as the age requirement suggest that
the "loophole" left open may be used by a very few taxpayers before Congress acts
to close it if such is the legislative decision.
Miller, 400 F.2d at 412. " [If] the taxpayer has found a hole in the dike of the Internal
Revenue Code, it is 'one that calls for the application of the Congressional thumb, not
the courts."' Estate of Edna Allen Miller, 48 T.C. 251, 264 (1967). aff'd, 400 F.2d
407 (3d Cir. 1968).
112. Draft Bill § 3(c), 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 56, 59.
113. Apparently neither the administration nor the Congressional Committees con-
sidered deleting section 2055(b)(2) from the Code. The section was not discussed before
the Ways and Means Committee and was mentioned in the committee reports only in a
footnote. The footnote merely summarized the substance of the provision and stated:
The shortening of the time for filing the return necessitates a change in the period
(from 1 year to 6 months) during which the surviving spouse must, under this provi-
sion, specify the charitable organizations in whose favor he intends to exercise the
power.
1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 5 n.I; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3. at 6 n.1. The provi-
sion was mentioned in the statement submitted by the Trust Division of the American
Bankers Association, but the discussion there was limited:
Section 2055(b)(2)(C): This section is a substantive provision relating to the chari-
table deduction. If there is acceleration the period used must be reduced. Rather
than using a 6-month period, it would be preferable to use the time for filing the
estate tax return as is done in the provisions of section 2055.
1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 236, 240.
114. See IRC §§ 170(f)(2), 664(d), 2055(e) and 2522(c). The limitations on the de-
ductibility of charitable remainder interests for estate tax purposes are applicable to
wills executed after October 9, 1969 but do not apply to wills executed before that date
if (1) the decedent dies prior to October 9, 1972 without having republished the will by
codicil or otherwise, (2) the decedent at no time after October 9, 1969 had the right to
change the provisions of the will pertaining to the passage of property to a charity, or (3)
the will is not republished prior to October 9, 1972 and the decedent on such date and at
all times thereafter is under a mental disability to republish the will.
Professor Douglas Kahn recently noted the inconsistency between sections 2055(b)(2)
and 2055(e), but concluded that "ii would appear that Congress intends to retain that
deduction, notwithstanding the inconsistent language of IRC § 2055(e)." Kahn, A
Guide to Estate and Gift Tax Amendments of 1970, 17 PRAC. LAWYER 13 (1971).
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tion for the remainder interest in a trust which meets the requirements
of section 2055(b)(2). 115 A trust cannot meet the requirement of sec-
tion 2055(b)(2) that "the surviving spouse of the decedent is entitled
for life to all of the net income from the trust" and also meet the re-
quirement of section 2055(e)(2) that it be either "a charitable re-
mainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust (described in
section 664)." The definitions contained in section 664(d) strictly limit
the extent of the non-charitable interests in charitable'remainder an-
nuity trusts and charitable remainder unitrusts. In general, the
non-charitable interests in such tfusts must be limited to the payment,
at least annually, of "a sum certain (which is not less than 5 percent of
the initial fair market value of all property placed in trust)" in the case
of a charitable remainder annuity trust and a "fixed percentage (which
is not less than 5 percent) of the fair market value of its assets, valued
annually," in the case of a charitable remainder unitrust. 116
115. Neither the terms of section 2055(e)(2) nor the pertinent legislative history al-
lows an interpretation which would exempt charitable remainder interests in section
2055(b)(2) trusts from the requirements of section 2055(e)(2). Section 2055(e)(2) pro-
vides that where interests in property (other than a remainder interest in a personal resi-
dence or farm or an undivided portion of the decedent's entire interest in property) pass
from a decedent to a charity and a non-charity, "no deduction shall be allowed under
this section for the interest which passes" to the charity in the case of a remainder in-
terest unless it is in a charitable remainder annuity trust, a charitable remainder uni-
trust or a pooled income fund. The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act does not
indicate any intention to exempt section 2055(b)(2) trusts from the restrictions imposed
by section 2055(e):
For the reasons discussed above, the committee amendments provide limitations(for income tax, gift tax, and estate tax purposes) on the allowance of a charitable
contribution deduction for a charitable gift of a remainder interest. As under the
House bill, a deduction is to be allowed for a charitable gift of a remainder interest
in trust, where there is a noncharitable income beneficiary, if the trust is either a
charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust. The com-
mittee agrees with the House that this requirement will provide a better means of
assuring that the amount received by the charity will accord with the charitable
deduction allowed to the donor on creation of the trust. This is because the require-
ment will remove the present incentive to favor the income beneficiary over the
remainder beneficiary by means of manipulating the trust's investments. The
amount received each year by the income beneficiary, generally, will have to be
either a stated dollar amount or a fixed percentage of the value of the trust prop-
erty.
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88. If section 2055(b)(2) trusts were found to
be exempt from the restrictions, it would be possible for the trustees of such trusts to
accomplish the evil which the restrictions were intended to prevent: The surviving
spouse could be favored "over the remainder beneficiary by means of manipulating the
trust's investments." Id.
116. Nor does it appear that a trust which met the income distribution requirements
of section 2055(b)(2) would qualify as a charitable remainder unitrust under the excep-
tion stated in section 664(d)(3). The exception provides that a trust may qualify as
charitable remainder unitrust if the instrument requires the trustee to pay the non-
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3. Change in the holding period rules
The Act amended section 1223 by adding a new paragraph,
number 11, under which all gains and losses realized from the sale or
other disposition of assets acquired from a decedent will be long
term.1 7 The administration included substantially the same provision
in its original proposal1 18 in order to avoid "taxing the executor too
heavily on short term gain on appreciation in value occuring after the
decedent's death where, for example, assets must be sold to make the
estimated tax payment." 119 The adoption of a universally applicable
earlier estate tax payment date in lieu of an estimated estate tax pay-
ment requirement of limited applicability increased the justification for
some modification of the holding period rules. The relaxation was
urged by the Tax Section in connection with its alternate proposals: 2 0
The acceleration of the alternative valuation date to 6 months after
the date of death and the payment date to 9 months after the date of
death will require the executor to liquidate assets to pay the tax within
a comparatively short period, frequently within 6 months after the
date of death.
Present law provides for a 6-month holding period as the dividing
line between short-term gain and the more favorably taxed long-term
gain. A principal purpose of this 6-month dividing line is to distin-
guish between speculators and investors. This distinction is not rele-
vant for liquidating sales by estates. Accordingly, the 6-month holding
period requirement should be eliminated for property included in the
gross estate; i.e., gains or losses on the sale or exchange of such prop-
erty, even within 6 months after the date of death, should be treated as
long-term gain or long-term loss. Under existing law pertaining to the
basis of property included in the gross estate, gain or loss would be
charitable beneficiary for any year, (1) the income of the trust if it is less than 5 per-
cent of the fair market value of its assets valued annually, and (2) the income of the trust
in excess of that amount to the extent that payments made in earlier years aggregate less
than the distributions which would have been made had 5 percent of the fair market
value of the assets of the trust (valued annually) been distributed in each earlier year.
Thus, a trust which calls for the distribution of all of its net income to a non-charitable
beneficiary as required by section 2055(b)(2) would not qualify under the exception.
117. The amendment applies only with respect to decedents dying after December
31, 1970. Excise, Estate and Gift Tax Adjustment Act of 1970 §§ 101(g), 101(j). 84
Stat. 1838.
118. Draft Bill § 6(h), 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 27.
119. Letter from Secretary Kennedy to Speaker McCormack, in 1970 Tax Hear-
ings, supra note 4, at 10.
120. Tax Section Statement, supra note 23, at 688.
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realized on a sale within 6 months after the date of death only with
respect to appreciation and depreciation since the date of death and
then only if the alternative valuation date were not elected.
The administration and the proponents of the alternate proposals
probably exaggerated the need for a change in the holding period
rules. There are a number of reasons why the advance in the payment
date would probably not have imposed too heavy an income tax
burden on most estates. First, executors commonly have a number of
assets from which to select ones to sell, not all of which will have ap-
preciated substantially in the six months following death. Indeed, tax
and investment strategy frequently calls for taxpayers (including es-
tates) to offset gains realized from the sale of appreciated assets during
a tax period by also selling assets which have declined in value. Sec-
ond, executors often have considerable leeway in determining the time
at which sales take place. In those cases the sale of assets which had
appreciated in value could be deferred, as has been the practice, until
six months or more after death. Third, if the executor elects to value
the estate on the alternate valuation date, sales of assets taking place
prior to that date will not result in any gains or losses. The election
has other important ramifications-it will affect an estate's estate tax
liability and the basis of virtually all assets included in the gross estate.
Fourth, the selection of a tax year for the estate could cause gains re-
alized on sales taking place within six months of death to be spread
over two of the estate's tax years. Fifth, by accident or design all or a
substantial part of the net gain realized on sales made during an es-
tate's income tax year might be offset by deductions for the period. A
trade-off would be involved with respect to deductions which may al-
ternatively be claimed on the estate tax return.
The consequences of the change in the holding period rules do not
appear to be entirely favorable to taxpayers. Taxpayers may be disad-
vantaged because a net short-term capital loss can no longer be in-
curred on the disposition of assets acquired from a decedent. The
importance of the distinctions between long-term and short-term losses
was heightened by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which amended sec-
tion 1211 to make short-term capital losses potentially twice as valu-
able to taxpayers as net long-term capital losses. 121 Capital losses may
121. "[S] ection 1211, as amended, permits the deduction of only 50 per cent of
net long-term capital losses against ordinary taxable income. Net short-term capital
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of course be carried over from year to year under section 1212 and to
the distributees upon the termination of an estate or trust under sec-
tion 642(h). Nevertheless, the loss of the option of incurring a net
short-term capital loss deprives taxpayers of some of the flexibility
they formerly enjoyed.
The amendment may also have accomplished too much from the
Government's point of view. The cure was not limited to the malady
induced by the advance in the payment date. The new provisions
apply regardless of the identity of the taxpayer involved (it is not lim-
ited to the executor or administrator of an estate)122 and regardless of
amount (it is not limited to the aggregate of death taxes, administra-
tion expenses and debts).
Included in the cases where the holding period will be deemed to be 6
months are cases involving joint tenancies, community property and
properties transferred in contemplation of death. For example, if a
surviving tenant sells property acquired by right of survivorship within
6 months of the date of the decedent's death, and the basis of the prop-
erty in the hands of the surviving joint tenant is determined (under sec.
1014(b)(9)) by reference to its value at the date of the decedent's
death (or alternate valuation date), the property is to be considered to
be held by the surviving joint tenant for more than 6 months. Simi-
larly, a surviving spouse's share of community property is to be con-
sidered as held by her for more than 6 months if it is sold within 6
months of the date of the decedent's death, regardless of when the
property was actually acquired by the marital community.' 3
The function the change was intended to serve might have been met
had the value of property which could be sold at a gain and be
deemed to have been held for more than six months been limited, in
the fashion of section 303, to the amount of death taxes and expenses
losses continue to be deductible in full under section 1211 as they were prior to the
amendment made by the Tax Reform Act of 1969." Maxfield, Capital Gains and
Losses. 25 TAX. L. REv. 565. 570 (1970).
122. A person who succeeds to an interest in the property of a decedent by reason
of another person's disclaimer may also be within the ambit of the new rules. Cf. IRC
§ 1014(b)(l). For the new rules to be applicable, however, the disclaimer would
probably have to be made within reasonable time after knowledge of the existence
of the transfer. Otherwise the person disclaiming the property would have made a gift
under Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958) and the donee might be held to have ac-
quired the property from him and not the decedent, for the purposes of section 1014.
For a useful discussion of the gift tax law relating to disclaimers see Note, Taxa-
tion: Disclaimers Under Federal and Minnesota Law, 51 MINN. L. REV. 907 (1967).
123. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 9; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 10.
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of administration. The provisions might also have been made appli-
cable only to property subject to claims or to sales made by persons
who were obligated to pay the federal estate tax on a decedent's es-
tate. The imposition of limitations such as these would concededly
have complicated the holding period provisions, but at least they
would have borne some relation to the need the change was intended
to meet.
Although the reports did not indicate the revenue effect the change
will have, presumably it will cause a decrease in the revenue derived
from the income tax imposed on sales of property acquired from dece-
dents. 24 Unlike the one-time increase in revenue which will result
from the advance of the payment date, this provision will have a con-
tinuing negative impact on revenue.
Two points regarding the change of the holding period rules should
be emphasized because of their importance. First, the change will put
information in the hands of planners at an earlier time in the estate
administration process and will enable them to plan the affairs of es-
tates earlier and with more certainty. Second, the new holding period
rules apply to all persons who acquire property from a decedent
within the meaning of section 1014 and sell or otherwise dispose of it
within six months of the date of his death. On the other hand, the
holding period of transferees of such persons will not be determined
under the new rule. 125
C. Changes With Respect to the Release of Executors and Other
Fiduciaries from Personal Liability for Federal Taxes
Prior to the Act, an executor could apply for discharge from per-
sonal liability for the estate tax under section 2204, in which case the
government was required to notify him of the amount of the tax
within one year after the application was made, or within one year
after the return was filed, if later.126 Upon payment of such amount
the executor was discharged from personal liability for any deficiency
124. Because of the preferential income tax treatment which is accorded long-term
capital gains under sections 1201 and 1202, a measure causing gains which were for-
merly short-term to become long-term will almost certainly result in some reduction in
the yield of the income tax.
125. Examples of such transferees are donees and trustees. See IRC §§ 1015,
1223(2).
126. The pre-1954 Code law on personal liability of fiduciaries is thoroughly re-
273
Washington Law Review
in the tax later found to be due. Discharge could be obtained only if
the executor paid the full amount of the tax. The Act amended section
2204 to enlarge the circumstances under which an executor may be
discharged from personal liability,' 2 7 and to extend essentially the
same opportunity for discharge to fiduciaries other than executors.'
28
Also, a new section, 6905, was added to the Code under which an
executor or administrator may obtain a discharge from personal lia-
bility for a decedent's income and gift tax liabilities. Finally, the pe-
riod within which the government must notify an applicant under sec-
tions 2204 or 6905 of the amount of the tax due was reduced from
one year to nine months with respect to decedents dying after De-
cember 31, 1973. None of these changes originated with the adminis-
tration; they are all traceable to the alternate proposals which were
advanced with various degrees of enthusiasm by the Trust Division of
the American Bankers Association and the Tax Section of the Amer-
ican Bar Association.
1. Discharge of Executors and Other Fiduciaries from Personal
Liability for Estate Taxes
As noted above, the Act liberalized the rules relating to discharge
from personal liability for estate tax deficiencies in two respects. First,
section 2204 was amended to provide that 129
The executor, on payment of the amount which he is notified (other
than any amount the time for payment of which is extended under sec-
tions 6161, 6163 or 6166), and on furnishing any bond which may be
required for any amount for which the time for payment is extended,
shall be discharged from personal liability for any deficiency in tax
thereafter found to be due.
The significance of this change is perhaps best indicated by briefly re-
viewing the scope of the personal liability of an executor or other
viewed in Alexander, Personal Liability of Executors and Trustees for Federal Income,
Estate and Gift Taxes, 9 TAX. L. REV. 1 (1953). The report of a committee of the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law also contains a
good discussion of the subject. Liability of Fiduciaries and Transferees for Federal Es-
tate and Gift Taxes, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 250 (1967).
127. IRC § 2204(a).
128. Id. § 2204(b).
129. Id. § 2204(a).
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fiduciary for the estate tax.1 30 Their personal liability is based on sec-
tions 3466 and 3467 of the Revised Statutes. 131 Section 3466 pro-
vides that when an estate is insufficient to pay all the debts of a dece-
dent, debts due the United States niust be paid first. The priority es-
tablished by section 3466 is enforced by section 3467, which subjects
a fiduciary to personal liability for debts due the United States to the
extent he pays other debts of the decedent "before he satisfies and
pays the debts due the United States." The matter is of particular con-
cern to fiduciaries because federal tax liabilities are considered debts
due the United States and the regulations treat the distribution of
property to a beneficiary as the payment of a debt.1 32 Funeral expen-
ses, the costs of administering the estate, widow's allowances and a
limited number of other obligations are not "debts" within the
meaning of section 3467 and may be paid without subjecting the ex-
ecutor or administrator to personal liability for the amount of the
payment.' 33 On the other hand, the expenses of the decedent's last ill-
ness are "debts."'1 34 Liability does not attach where other debts are
paid unless the executor has "personal knowledge of the debt [due the
United States], or has such knowledge as would put a reasonably
prudent man on inquiry.' 35 Despite this limitation, "potential per-
130. The executor's personal liability for federal taxes of the decedent and his estate
is the subject of Chapter 9 of a recently published, admirable work, M. FERGUSON, J.
FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES
654-83 (1970).
131. 31U.S.C.§§ 191, 192 (1970).
132. Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1958) provides:
Thus, if the executor pays a debt due by the decedent's estate or distributes any por-
tion of the estate before all the estate tax is paid, he is personally liable, to the ex-
tent of the payment or distribution, for so much of the estate tax as remains due
and unpaid.
The administrative extension of the meaning of "debts" to include the distribution of
property to beneficiaries has been criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Alexander, Per-
sonal Liability of Executors and Trustees for Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxes, 9
TAX L. REV. 1 (1953). The extension has been rejected by the Tax Court in at least
two cases. Edward M. Leuthesser, 18 T.C. 1112 (1952); C. W. Posey, 10 T.C.M.
383 (1951). It has been upheld by some of the lower federal courts. See, e.g., United
States v. Monroe, 65 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Pa. 1946); United States v. First Hunting-
ton Nat'l Bank, 34 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. W. Va. 1940), aff d 117 F.2d 376 (4th Cir.
1941); United States v. Cruickshank, 48 F.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Weisburn, 43 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1943), and
Malcolm D. Champlin, 6 T.C. 280 (1946) (estate administration expenses).
134. S.M. 5032, V-1 CUM. BULL. 109 (1926).
135. Rev. Rul. 66-43, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 291, 293. 3ee also Irving Trust Co., 36




sonal liability naturally deters an executor or administrator from
making estate assets available to the intended beneficiaries until such
liability is eliminated."' 136 The purpose of the amendments to section
2204 was to remove that deterrent to the early distribution of a dece-
dent's property.
This change is welcome even though it will benefit only the execu-
tors of estates which receive an extension under sections 6161, 6163,
or 6166. In those cases it will enable an executor to distribute all of
the assets of an estate at an earlier time free of the risk of personal
liability for a deficiency in estate taxes later found to be due. An exec-
utor will no longer need to protect himself against personal exposure
for the extended portion of the estate tax by retaining control over
assets of the estate or by obtaining bonds, guarantees, or indemnity
agreements from the distributees of the estate. The change should not
impair the collectibility of the extended portion of the tax, which
could be satisfied from assets remaining in the executor's hands, from
the assets of distributees 137 or from the surety on the executor's
bond.138
The second change added a provision to section 2204 which makes
a similar procedure available to fiduciaries (other than executors) for
resident decedents.M1a : The fiduciary may obtain a discharge from per-
sonal liability for the estate tax upon the discharge of the executor
from personal liability for the tax or six months after the fiduciary
makes application for discharge, if later. Read literally, the fiduciary
may obtain a discharge only if an executor or administrator has been
136. 1 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 136 (3d ed. 1961).
137. "If the estate tax imposed by chapter II is not paid when due, then the ...
transferee... who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death, property included
in the gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive, to the extent of the value, at
the time of the decedent's death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such
tax." IRC § 6324(a)(2).
138. Id. § 2204(a). Section 2204 "does not shorten the time for assessment against
and collection from the estate or transferees of estate assets." M. FERGUSON, J.
FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES
681-82 (1970).
139. Id. § 2204(b). The new provision requires that the application of a fiduciary for
the determination of the tax for which he is liable "be accompanied by a copy of the in-
strument, if any, under which such fiduciary is acting, a description of the property held
by the fiduciary, and such other information for purposes of carrying out the provisions
of this section as the Secretary or his delegate may require by regulations." Id. Presum-
ably regulations will soon be issued furnishing further information regarding the form
of the application, the mechanics for filing it and the further information which must be
submitted with it.
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appointed and has obtained a discharge from personal liability under
section 27204(a). This aspect of the new rules provides another reason
to conduct an estate administration proceeding even though few, if
any, assets will be subject to administration. In any case, a fiduciary
will be discharged only upon payment of the amount of the tax for
which it is determined he is liable, excluding amounts for which the
time for payment has been extended under. sections 6161, 6163 or
6166. The amendment does not specify the manner in which the ex-
tent of the fiduciary's liability will be computed. It has been suggested
that the fiduciary should be released "if as to property in his posses-
sion and control, all unextended estate taxes, at the estate's average
estate tax rate have been paid and security interests have been created
for any extended estate taxes on that property."' 40 As in the case of
executors, the Act provides that a fiduciary may be required to furnish
a bond covering any amount for which the time for payment has been
extended. 141
This second change was made principally for the benefit of the trus-
tees of trusts created by a decedent during his lifetime. The apparent
intention of the change was to provide a procedure under which a
person subject to personal liability 42 might obtain a discharge for the
tax except to the extent of his beneficial interest in the decedent's
property. The actual scope of the provision is somewhat vague be-
cause of the uncertain scope of the term "fiduciary." Generally, "the
term 'fiduciary' means a guardian, trustee, executor, administrator,
receiver, conservator, or any person acting in any fiduciary capacity
of any person."'1 43 Under that definition, persons who are not nor-
mally thought to be fiduciaries may take advantage of the new provi-
sions of section 2204. For example, a life tenant might qualify under
the rationale of a ruling which held a life tenant to be a fiduciary
within the meaning of the Code where he had the power to sell the
property in which he held a life interest and was under a duty to rein-
vest and conserve the proceeds of a sale for the benefit of the remain-
140. Memorandum of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association
Containing Suggestions for Liberalizing the Current Extensions of Time for Payment of
Estate Taxes, 1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 251, 253.
141. IRC § 2204(b).
142. Id. § 6324(a)(2).
143. Id. § 7701(6).
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dermen. 144 Presumably, a person to whom a decedent bequeathed
property as a custodian for a minor under the Uniform Gifts to Mi-
nors Act would also be a fiduciary. 145
This change should also be welcome although it will probably most
often only serve to relieve the anxiety of trustees and will not hasten
the distribution of property to beneficiaries. This conclusion is
founded upon the assumption that the corpus of trusts will most often
remain intact and will not be distributed to the beneficiaries until a
time beyond the normal final determination of federal estate tax lia-
bility. Even so, the change serves a useful purpose and should not
impair the collectibility of the estate tax.1 46 As the Committees ob-
served: "[A] fiduciary has a legitimate concern as to the extent of his
personal liability and in your committee's view should not be subject
to a greater risk than is essential to the protection of the revenue."' 47
With respect to the extension to other fiduciaries of the opportunity
to obtain a discharge, the committee reports stated that "Present law
in the Internal Revenue Code (sec. 2204) authorizes an executor or
administrator, but not a trustee, to be relieved of personal liability for
estate tax if he makes written application . ... "148 Presumably the
Committees' statements are based upon Revenue Ruling 57-424,
which has led others to the same conclusion. 149 In fact this Ruling
does not support such a broad statement. The pertinent portion of the
ruling reads: t 51
Held, where there is an executor or administrator of the decedent's
estate appointed, qualified, and acting within the United States, the
term "executor" as used in section 2204 of the Code does not extend
144. Rev. Rul. 61-102, 1961-1 Cum. BULL. 245 (life tenant should report the gain
realized on a sale of the property on a fiduciary income tax return under section 641
rather than on his individual income tax return).
145. A version of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act in effect in some states author-
izes a testamentary gift of property to a custodian. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
21.24.020(1) (1970).
146. As indicated earlier in connection with the release of executors from personal
liability for the tax, the government may recover a deficiency from assets still in the pos-
session of the fiduciary, from a transferee personally liable for the tax or from the surety
on a bond furnished with respect to the portion of the tax for which an extension of time
to pay the tax was granted. See notes 137-38 and accompanying text, supra.
147. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 6; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 6.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., 2 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1132 n.2 7 (3d ed. 1961); M. FER-
GUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND
BENEFICIARIES 681 (1970).
150. Rev. Rul. 57-424, 1957-2 Cums. BULL. 623 (emphasis added).
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to any other person. Accordingly, the provisions of § 2204 are avail-
able only to the executor, the trustees of the trust created by the dece-
dent, the assets of which were included in his gross estate, are not
entitled to a certificate of discharge from personal liability.
By its terms the ruling applies only "where there is an executor or
administrator of the decedent's estate appointed, qualified and acting
within the United States." The ruling merely follows the definition of
"executor" in section 2203, under which the trustee of an inter vivos
trust created by a decedent would be an executor if there were no ex-
ecutor or administrator appointed, qualified and acting within the
United States. As such, a trustee would have appeared entitled to
apply for and obtain a discharge under the pre-existing provisions of
section 2204.151 Nothing in Revenue Ruling 57-424 suggests the con-
trary.
2. Discharge of the Executor from Personal Liability for a Dece-
dent's Income and Gift Taxes
The Act added section 6905 to the Code, thereby establishing a
procedure whereby an executor can obtain a discharge from personal
liability for the decedent's income and gift tax liability. 52 Under it, an
executor may apply for a release from personal liability for !such
taxes at any time after the returns are filed for the taxes involved. If he
does so he will be discharged from personal liability for the taxes in-
volved either upon payment of the amount he is notified is due, or one
year after the receipt of his application if he is not notified of the
amount due within that period.
Not surprisingly, the new procedure was urged on the House Ways
and Means Committee by the Trust Division of the American Bank-
151. Sections 2203 and 2204, and Revenue Ruling 57-424 appear to have received
this interpretation. Greenbaum, Tax Responsibilities of the Executor, The Administra-
tor, The Trustee, in 3 J. LASSER, ESTATE TAX TECHNIQUES § 2026.12 (1970):
The discharge from personal liability for estate taxes may only be granted to an
"executor" as that term is defined in section 2203. Where the executor of an estate
and the trustees of an inter vivos trust, the assets of which were included in the es-
tate for estate tax purposes, both applied for discharge from personal liability, the
Commissioner ruled that the provisions of Section 2204 were available only to the
executor.
152. "[T] he term 'executor' means the executor or administrator of the decedent
appointed, qualified, and acting within the United States." IRC § 6905(b).
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ers' Association.1 53 In accepting and supporting the proposal, the
Committee argued, first, that "existing law contains no procedure
whereby an executor can obtain a discharge from personal liability for
these taxes" and, second, that 154
[ti he continuing threat to the executor of personal liability for any
income and gift taxes of the decedent in some instances is as much of a
deterrent to the rapid completion of the administration of the estate
and the distribution of estate assets as his personal liability for the es-
tate tax.
The argument establishing the "need" for the new procedure com-
pletely ignored an existing procedure under which an executor can
protect himself against personal liability for a decedent's unknown
income and gift tax liabilities. And although the argument that there
was no procedure under which an executor could be relieved from
personal liability for a decedent's income and gift taxes is technically
correct, it is misleading.
Previously an executor could not obtain a certificate of discharge.
He could, however, achieve the functional equivalent-a limitation on
the assessment of any deficiency for the income and gift taxes-by
filing a request for prompt assessment under section 6501(d). 15 5 The
153. At the hearings the Association's spokesman, Edwin R. MacKethan, com-
plained that the administration's version of the alternate proposal did not include such a
provision:
The administration's new proposal does propose that section 2204 be modified to
permit a fiduciary other than an executor to secure a discharge for personal lia-
bility for estate tax. However, it fails to deal with the decedent's liabilities for in-
come tax and gift tax. We have discussed this omission informally with representa-
tives of the Treasury and been advised that extension of the discharge to income tax
and to gift tax would present "administrative problems" for the Internal Revenue
Service because audits of three types of returns are involved. We are unimpressed
with the justification. The discharge provision should be expanded to coved [sic]
income tax and gift tax as well as estate tax.
1970 Tax Hearings, supra note 4, at 235. The House Ways and Means Committee ac-
cepted the argument and the provision was included in the bill reported out by the
Committee. As there was little or no need for the new procedure, the Committee should
have rejected the addition of another section of the Code which involves the filing of ad-
ditional forms.
154. 1970 H. R. REP., supra note 33, at 7; 1970 S. REP. supra note 3, at 8.
155. The functional similarity of the discharge provisions of section 2204 and the
limitation on assessment provisions of section 6501(d) has been noted elsewhere. See NI.
FERGUSON, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND
BENEFICIARIES 679-82 (1970); Ferguson, The Fiduciary's Personal Liability for Federal
Taxes of the Decedent and His Estate: The Problems of Distribution and Partial Distri-
bution, N.Y.U. 25th INST. ON FED. TAX. 1185. 1216-20 (1967).
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provisions of section 6501(d) require that income or gift tax liabilities
of a decedent be assessed within eighteen months after the receipt of a
written request for prompt assessment.' 56 In the ordinary case, if the
eighteen month period expires without assessment, an executor cannot
be held personally liable for the taxes unless he had personal knowl-
edge of the liability, or had such knowledge as would put a reasonably
prudent man on inquiry.' 57 In most cases, a diligent executor could
apply for discharge shortly after he was appointed and be discharged
eighteen months thereafter.
The second statement in support of the new procedure, that it re-
moves an obstacle to the rapid completion of estate administration, is
also misleading. At most, the new procedure merely advances the time
at which an intermediate obstacle can be eliminated. However, that
advance will probably not advance the time at which a tax-liability-
conscious executor will distribute the assets of an estate. The reason is
that an executor's personal liability for the estate tax, which is nor-
mally of greater concern, will persist for some time after a discharge
from personal liability for income and gift taxes can be obtained
under the new procedure.
A discharge under section 2204 ordinarily cannot be obtained prior
to twenty-seven months after the death of a decedent dying prior to
January 1, 1971,158 twenty-one months after the death of a decedent
dying between January 1, 1971 and December 31, 1973,159 and
eighteen months after the death of a decedent dying on or after Jan-
uary 1, 1974.160 Where an early request for prompt assessment is
made, the eighteen month limitation period of section 6501(d) will
156. A request can only be made after a return has been filed. The regulations re-
quire that it be transmitted separately from any other document. Treas. Reg. §
301.6501(d)-1(b) (1956).
157. Other provisions of section 6501 allow an assessment to be made at any time
in the case of false or fraudulent returns, willful attempt to evade tax, or when no return
is filed. IRC § 6501(c). Assessment may be made within 6 years after filing in the case of
substantial omissions from gross income. Id. § 6501(e). However, an executor is not
personally liable for any of the taxes assessed under those provisions unless he had per-
sonal knowledge of the liability or had such knowledge as would put a reasonably pru-
dent man on inquiry. Rev. Rul. 66-43, 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 291, 292.
158. The 15 month period within which the return could be filed plus the 12 month
discharge period.
159. The 9 month period within which the return could be filed plus the 12 month
discharge period.




expire prior to the time a discharge from personal liability for the es-
tate tax could be obtained under section 2204. The estate tax, pay-
ment of which is considered by many to be a prerequisite to distribu-
tion of an estate's assets, 161 was, is, and will continue to be the tax of
most concern to executors who are apprehensive about their potential
personal liability for taxes under section 3467 of the Revised Statutes. 162
This marginally useful section of the Code is unfortunate because it
calls for executors to file yet another document. The number of docu-
ments which may be filed by fiduciaries, if not the procedures them-
selves, have proliferated beyond all reason. Excluding tax returns and
the preliminary estate tax notice, 163 an executor may file seven sep-
arate notices or applications under the current provisions of the
Code.164 With the exception of the application under section 6905,
the same documents may be filed by a fiduciary other than an executor.
The current law places a considerable burden on fiduciaries; they
must maintain a stock of the required forms and applications, and
calendar reminders to prepare them for each decedent they represent,
as well as complete and file the forms. The government, as the recip-
ient and processor of the forms, is also subjected to a considerable
burden.
The Service should review each of the existing procedures to deter-
mine whether it fulfills a need which justifies its continuation. This
review might be initiated by the government in connection with the
issuance of regulations pertaining to the promised elimination of the
preliminary estate tax notice. It would be an improvement if some of
the procedures could be eliminated without prejudicing taxpayers or
161. 1970 Tax Hearitngs, supra note 4, at 253.
162. See notes 131-136 and accompanying text, supra.
163. The preliminary estate tax notice has been discontinued. 1971 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 6, at 89. Although this notice has been discontinued, some other regulation may be
issued requiring that a different notice of qualification be filed. Secton 6036 still con-
tains the basic requirement that "every executor (as defined in section 2203)... give
notice of his qualification as such to the Secretary or his delegate in such manner and
at such time as may be required by regulations .. "
164. The notices or applications include the following: (1) application for employer
identification number, form S.S. 4, IRC § 6109; (2) notice of fiduciary relationship,
form 56, id. § 6903; (3) notice of termination of fiduciary capacity and, possibly, change
in fiduciary capacity, id.; (4) notice of qualification of fiduciary, id. § 6036; (5) request
for prompt assessment of income and gift taxes, id. § 6501(d); (6) application for dis-
charge from personal liability for estate taxes, id. § 2204; and (7) application for dis-
charge from personal liability for decedent's income and gift taxes, id. § 6905.
A notice under section 6036 will also meet the section 6903 notice requirement.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6036-1(c) (1960).
282
Vol. 47: 237, 1972
Tax Legislation
the government and without doing violence to the organizational
structure of the Code. Even if none could be eliminated entirely, it
might be possible to revise them to reduce the number of separate fil-
ings which may be made. Certainly some of the administrative bur-
dens on taxpayers and the government could be reduced if some docu-
ments were made to serve multiple purposes. 165
The current law is probably also deficient in that it promotes un-
equal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. Professional fiduciaries,
who are fully aware of all of the available procedures, probably take
advantage of them to the end that they are relieved from personal lia-
bility for a decedent's taxes earlier than inexperienced fiduciaries who
are probably not even aware of the existence of most of the discharge
procedures. As the inexperienced probably do comply with require-
ments which receive greater publicity, an effort should be made to
ipcrease general taxpayer awareness of the provisions. The unequal
treatment of taxpayers which may result from some taxpayers' lack of
familiarity with the procedures could be reduced if the estate tax re-
turn and other widely used documents were accompanied by instruc-
tions which described the effects of making the requests. 166
D. Administrative Changes Relating to the Estate Tax
During the hearings, the Congressional Committees were assured
that the Internal Revenue Service would take some administrative ac-
165. For example, it should be possible to revise the application for employer iden-
tification number (form SS-4) which is required of all fiduciaries. See Treas. Reg. §
1.6109-1(c)(3) (1962). This form could also serve as the notice of fiduciary relationship
under section 6903 (present form 56) and as the notice of qualification as a fiduciary
under section 6036. If that revision were accomplished, a fiduciary would be required to
file only one notice shortly after a decedent's death. Similarly, the request for prompt
assessment of taxes under section 650 1(d), and the applications for discharge from per-
sonal liability for estate tax (section 2204) and decedent's income and gift taxes (section
6905) might also be combined. A form could easily be constructed which would give a
taxpayer the option of applying under each of those sections.
166. Perhaps the federal estate tax return could be modified to allow requests for
discharges from personal liability to be made on it and to include complete instructions
with respect to them. If that were done, requests under those sections could be made by
filing a consolidated request form or by making the appropriate entries on the estate tax
return. Of course the government might initially oppose such a change because of an
apparent preference that each request be filed separately from other documents. See,
e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(d)-l(b)(1956) (each request under section 6501(d) must be
made and transmitted separately). Another reason for government opposition might be
that such a change would increase the number of taxpayers making requests. Neither of
these grounds are of sufficient weight to overcome the advantages of the suggested modi-
fications. First, taxpayers could be required to file a sufficient number of copies of a
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tions which would speed the settlement of federal estate tax liabilities.
In particular, the Committees were given to understand that the
Service would: 16 7
(1) Issue instructions to the field offices to give high priority to the
classification and audit of estate tax returns;
(2) Eliminate the requirement for a preliminary notice (on form 704
or 705) of the death of a decedent having a gross estate in excess of
$60,000; and
(3) Revise instructions to executors regarding the supporting material
which should be filed with the estate tax return in order to emphasize
that the audit will be delayed if the material is not filed promptly.
Although the actions described may not have a substantial beneficial
effect, they are steps in the right direction. The actions are perhaps
more significant as indicia of an increased willingness on the part of
the Service to modify its internal procedures to achieve a degree of
"reform" than they are as "reforms" themselves.
Standing alone, the issuance of the instructions described in item 1
will not speed the tax determination process to any significant degree.
On the other hand, if the instructions were accompanied by an in-
crease in the number of personnel assigned to estate and gift tax audit
groups, or a reduction in the number or thoroughness of estate tax
audits they might have an impact. Whatever steps are taken, the
Service should have in mind the provisions of the Act which will
permit the earlier discharge of executors and other fiduciaries from
personal liability for the taxes of persons dying after December 3 1,
1973.
consolidated request to enable the necessary distribution to be made to the appropriate
offices within the Service. The form itself could include a sufficient number of copies
whether it was a separate document or an attachment to the estate tax return. Second,
the probability that more requests for releases would result if the change were made can
be viewed as a desirable rather than an undesirable result. If the tax law is to include
provision for the releases they should be made equally available to fiduciaries as a
matter of fact as well as a matter of theory. The concern for the fairness of the tax
system should override any inconvenience which might result. Finally, the estate tax
closing letter might be modified to include a reminder that fiduciaries should promptly
inform the government when their status as a fiduciary terminates. There is no reason
why the necessary formality should not be accompanied by the maximum degree of as-
sistance.
167. 1970 H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 13; 1970 S. REP., supra note 3, at 13.
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The preliminary estate tax notice (forms 704 or 705) has been elim-
inated as called for in item 2.168 While form 704 was not particularly
burdensome to prepare and file, neither was it of particular value to
taxpayers or to the government. In most cases in which it was filed, it
provided the government with little information other than the fact of
an individual's death. At the most it ordinarily provided the govern-
ment with only an approximation of the size of a decedent's gross es-
tate and little or no data regarding the composition of the estate. 169
The elimination of the form seemed clearly indicated as other filings
will inform the government of an individual's death and as the time
for filing the estate tax return has been advanced. Hopefully the de-
mise of the preliminary notice will stimulate interest in the elimination
of some of the other forms which are now required of fiduciaries.
The instructions to executors regarding the necessity of filing sup-
plemental documents were amplified in the July 1971 revision of the
estate tax return (form 706) in accordance with the Committees' un-
derstandings. Part G of the general instructions includes a warning in
bold-face type that a failure to file the supplemental documents called
for in the instructions accompanying the several schedules will delay
the audit of the return. Part G was also improved by listing examples
of the supplemental documents which must be filed with the return.
The immediately preceding version of the estate tax return, which had
been revised in 1966, only referred to the need to file a certified copy
of the decedent's will and "[o] ther supplemental documents... re-
quired as hereinafter explained under the instructions for the several
schedules." That hardly highlighted the need to file supplementary
documents--particularly because supplemental documents might be
required under virtually all nineteen of the schedules. The new form
of the instructions should provide executors with useful and often
needed guidance.
CONCLUSION
Conceived, debated and passed in haste, the Act, on balance, rep-
resents a modest improvement in the law. The provisions relating to
168. See note 164, supra.
169. "As a matter of practice it is believed fiduciaries often state no more on the
notice than "in excess of $60,000." ' Liability of Fiduciaries and Transferees for Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 250, 252 n.23 (1967).
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the estate tax liberalize the law in some important respects and may
result in a modicum of reform in estate administration procedures.
Hopefully they will be followed by some administrative improve-
ments, including revisions of the forms of notices called for by the
Code and in the form of the estate tax return itself. The gift tax
changes are essentially neutral in character-the burdens they impose
on taxpayers and the government are not so onerous as to outweigh
the benefits to be derived from the more current payment of the gift
tax. Although the Act extended the excise taxes on automobiles and
communications services for a substantial period, the automobile tax
was subsequently eliminated as called for by the President. 170 The
extension may contribute to the ultimate demise of the excise tax on
communications services. It is difficult, however, to muster any kind
words for the two tax reduction features of the Act. There does not
appear to be any sufficient justification for either the aircraft use tax
exemption for non-jet aircraft or the further emasculation of the
minimum tax on tax preference income. The latter, which the House
would have rejected had it been free to do so without jeopardizing
passage of the Act, is particularly objectionable and should be re-
considered at the earliest opportunity, despite the administration's
reticence.
Although the Act is an important piece of tax legislation, hopefully
it will not be taken as a substitute for the long-promised reform of the
gift and estate tax laws. The recent lack of enthusiasm for reform
manifested by Secretary Connally and some vocal spokesmen for in-
terested groups' 71 should not delay Congressional consideration of the
subject. An ample number of studies and recommendations are avail-
able for the House Ways and Means Committee to pursue without
delay. Action by the Committee might induce the birth of Treasury
proposals which have suffered through an uncommonly long gestation
period.
170. See note 2, supra.
171. The statements of Secretary Connally on the subject are referred to in note 25,
supra. For recent examples of the simplistic and generally unpersuasive criticisms of the
proposed reforms, see Chabrow, Estate and Gift Tax Reform--Reform for Reform's
Sake?, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 254 (1971), and Theis, Some Hard Questions About Es-
tate and Gift Tax Reform, 109 TRUSTS & ESTATES 465 (1970). As might be expected,
Rene Wormser has also loosed some barbed shafts at the reform proposals in The Cap-
ital Levy in the Capital Gains Tax, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 94 (1971), and Will Estate
Tax Suffer Next "Reform," Wall St. Journal, Mar. 23, 1970, at 12, col. 3 (Eastern ed.).
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